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PROBLEM OF RACIL

IMBALANCE

A. RacialImbalance:Its Causes and Scope
Eleven years after the decision of the Supreme Court in the School
Segregation Cases,1 white and Negro children remain separated in
many school systems throughout the nation. In the South this racial
separation has been persistently fostered by both school and public
officials.2 Since the rationale of the School Segregation Cases to the
effect that official policy requiring separation on the basis of race is
prohibited, this racial separation in the South, commonly known as
3
segregation, is clearly illegal.
Separation of the races in the school systems of the North and
West has resulted both from devious types of racially motivated
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
2. 1963 U.S. CoMM 'N ON CivIL R GHTs REP. 63.
3. In the School Segregation Cases, the Supreme Court held that separate but equal
was inherently unequal and hence violative of the Constitution. This epochal decision
invalidated statutes in seventeen states (all below the Mason-Dixon line) that compelled segregation and those in four other states and the District of Columbia flint
permitted it. GREENBERG, RACE RELAI ONS & AMEmCAN LAw 245 (1958).
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action by public educational authorities4 and from fortuitously created
racial concentrations.5 Primarily a northern problem, 6 this fortuitous
racial separation in the public schools has been popularly termed "de
facto segregation." 78 A more accurate designation of this situation is
"racial imbalance." Racial imbalance in the public schools results
most commonly where neighborhood attendance policies 9 are superimposed on the homogenous racial populations of the large Northern
cities.
The basic reason for the large racial concentration in the northern
cities is the prevailing patterns of housing segregation. 10 This resi4. See Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as
premature, 288 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.), remedy considered on rehearing, 195 F. Supp. 231
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), stay denied, 82 Sup. Ct. 10, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 940 (1961), order modified by application of school board, 221 F. Supp. 275
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), where the unlawful segregation for which relief was ordered was
found to be the result of school board action.
5. Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 228 (1962). The School Segregation Cases clearly declared as invalid segregation
resulting from racially motivated action by public officials; whether these decisions also
declare invalid separation of the races due to purely fortuitous causes is not clear.
See, e.g., Note, 39 IND. L. REv. 606 (1964); Comment, 9 VILL. L. PEv. 283 (1964).
6. Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 Vn.L. L. REv. 353 (1961).
7. Ibid.
8. The use of the terminology "de facto segregation" is both semantically and
logically incorrect. The term "de facto segregation" is popularly used to indicate the
common situation where there is separation of the races on a basis other than race.
"Segregation," however, implies separation on the basis of race. "Segregation" is a
legal conclusion which denotes unconstitutionality. Therefore, calling separation of the
races in the schools due to purely fortuitous reasons "de facto segregation" assumes the
conclusion as to the legal validity of this problem. "The term de facto segregation
makes the racially imbalanced school appear . . . [to be] the Northern counterpart
of segregated education under the Jim Crow laws . . . . [A]s such, the term distorts
reality and paralyzes thought." Fiss, Racial Imbalance In The Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REv. 564, 566 (1965). As a more accurate term,
racial imbalance will be used in this note to denote fortuitous racial separation in the
public schools.
9. "The neighborhood school is particularly characteristic of the organization of
elementary schools in urban areas. There with younger children involved, concern is
felt for having the schools close at hand and available along safe routes which avoid
major traffic problems . . . . A neighborhood school-however defined-reflects the
economic, social, cultural, and racial characteristics of the area served." Foster, The
North and West Have Problems Too, in INTEGRATION VS SEGREGATION 174 (Humphrey
ed. 1964).
10. Attributing the cause of residential segregation to housing discrimination the
Civil Bights Commission reported:
"In Phoenix, '97 per cent of practically all the Negroes live within a radius of 1 mile
of the railroad tracks or the riverbed'; in Newark 'approximately 83 per cent are concentrated in 6 of Newark's 12 delineated neighborhoods. Three of these are the most
deteriorated neighborhoods in the city'; in Indianapolis, '89 per cent of the Negroes . . .
live in an area called center township. This is considered the inner city . . . and the
structures there run from 75 years to a 100 years old."' 1963 U.S. Cowna'r ON Civr
RIGHTS REP. 163.
In New York City a writer reports that "despite a city ordinance forbidding it,
discrimination in housing is still widespread, and in any case the residential patterns
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dential segregation may occur because of zoning ordinances," court

enforcement of racially restricted covenants,'2 or the establishment

of racially segregated public housing. 13 Other reasons for the racial

concentrations are the sharpened economic stratification of the population, 14 the economic disabilities of the Negro, 15 the flight of middleclass families to the suburbs, 16 and the failure of the17Negro effectively
to shed an existing ghettoized residential pattern.
Although there is no precise definition of racial imbalance, it is

most obviously indicated where a school is predominately Negro. The
New Jersey Commission of Education ruled that the schools were
created by it still exist." Glazier, Is Integration Possible in New York Schools?,
ed. 1964). See also 1963 U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS STAFF REP., PUBLIC EDUCATION 58.
11. See Holland v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 258 F.2d 730. (5th Cir. 1958),
where the court said:
"In the light of compulsory residential segregation of the races by city ordinance,
it is wholly unrealistic to assume that complete segregation of the races existing in
the public schools is either voluntary or the incidental result of valid rules not based
on race." Id. at 732. This has occurred despite the fact that zoning ordinances requiring racial segregation have long been unconstitutional.
12. Prior to 1948, racially restrictive covenants were enforced with full validity.
Although these covenants were rendered unenforcible by the Supreme Court in Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the effect of these covenants linger. In Woods v.
Board of Educ., Civil No. 21593, E. D. Mich. 1961, racially restrictive covenants were
claimed to have made the area around Thomson School in Highland Park, Michigan,
exclusively Negro. U.S. CoNvr'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CrvIL RIGHTS U.S.A.-PuBc
SCHOOLS, Cms N THE NORTH ANm WEsT 17, 24 (1962).
13. For examples of racial imbalance allegedly caused by federal public housing,
see Balabin v. Rubin, 20 App. Div. 2d 438, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1964), where the court
held that the rejected school zone was racially imbalanced "because of the residential
segregation resulting from large public housing projects in the proposed zone." Id. at
441, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 577. A more subtle influence preventing correction of racial
imbalance is the Federal Urban Renewal Law.
"The Federal urban renewal law requires a city to pay part of the cost of each renewal
project. The city may earn credit toward its obligation by constructing new public
facilities, such as schools. But if these facilities derive more than 20 per cent of their
use from people living outside of the renewal area, the city loses part of the credit
toward its obligation. This, discourages any local policy to locate and district a school
to promote a racially heterogeneous school population, if, to achieve this objective,
more than 20 per cent of the pupils would have to live outside of the renewed area
and be included in the school's attendance area." 1963 U.S. Co~naf'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS
STAFF REP., PUB. EDUCATION vi n.2.
in INTEGRATIoN Vs SEGREGATION 186 (Humphrey

14. NATIONAL CozNrrY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL, DE FACTO SEGREGATION
IN PU3LIC SCHOOLS 4 (1964).

15. Foster, supra note 9, at 173.
16. "The Negroes have pointed out that although the primary cause of racial
imbalance in the schools may be the private residential discrimination, the very
Toleration
imbalance in the schools also aids in furthering housing discrimination ....
of racial imbalance in the schools often requires white residents of a changing area
who might otherwise stay, to move to other districts. Being thus driven from their
former neighborhood may induce them the next time to fight more effectively against
any Negro occupancy." Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and The Schools-Part III:
The Gary Litigation, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 121, 169 (1964).
17. Fiss, supranote 8, at 585.
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racially imbalanced when they were 96.2 per cent,18 98 per cent, 19
and 99 per cent20 Negro. On the other hand, New York's Commissioner of Education considered a racially imbalanced school "as one
having 50 per cent or more Negro pupils enrolled."21 Because of these
widely varying views, any definitive assessment of racial imbalance
requires an examination of the entire school system.22 A predominantly
Negro school in a predominantly Negro school system is not racially
imbalanced. Thus, in addition to the "predominantly Negro" criterion,
the proportion of Negroes in the school must drastically exceed the
proportion of Negroes in the other public schools in the system. A
when it is "both predominantly
school is racially imbalanced only
23
Negro and literally imbalanced.
When racial imbalance is defined in this manner, the scope of the
problem in the school systems of the North and West is staggering.
It was reported that in 1961, 75 of New York City's 570 schools were
90 per cent Negro and Puerto Rican. In Chicago, 87 per cent of
the Negro elementary pupils attended practically all-Negro schools.
In Detroit, 45 per cent of 107,000 Negro children were in schools
where 80 per cent of the school population was Negro. In Philadelphia
where 47 per cent of the students were Negro, 38 schools had Negro
enrollments of 99 per cent. Los Angeles had 43 elementary schools
that were at least 85 per cent Negro.2
Although northern Negroes have protested racial imbalance since
even before the Brown decision,25 their success was minimal2 6 until
the early sixties when the civil rights movement gained momentum.
At this time Negro protests changed from petitions and personal
appearances before school boards to various types of public demonstra27
tions as well as recourse to both state and federal courts.
RACE EL. L. REP. 1228 (1963).
19. Spruill v. Board of Educ., 8 RACE REL.. L. REP. 1234 (1963).
20. Fisher v. Board of Educ., 8 RAcE BEL. L. REP. 730 (1963).
21. Memorandum to All Chief Local School Administrators and Presidents of Boards

18. Booker v. Board of Educ., 8

of Education, N.Y. State Comm'r of Educ., June 14, 1963, 8 RACE
739 (1963).

LEL.L. REP. 738,

22. For an enumeration of the criteria California considers important, see CAL. ADm.

CODE tit. 5, § 20 ii.
23. Fiss, supra note 8, at 565.

24. Maslow, supra note 6, at 354-55. See, e.g., 1963 U.S. ComlM ON CIVrL RiGHTs
STAFF REP., supra note 10, at 62-63.
25. Although Negro protests against racial imbalance were few in number, they did
result in the formation of the now-famous Princeton Plan which was developed in
Princeton, New Jersey in 1948. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and The Schools-Part I:
The New Rochelle Experience, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 3 (1963).
26. Before Brown "the movement in this direction, however, was hardly perceptible,
and in those Northern areas where Negroes did protest over education, their efforts
were directed either to improving the quality of education in the Negro schools or to
preventing methods they regarded as deliberate segregation." Ibid.
27. Professor Kaplan argues that despite some successes the scope of racial imbalance
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Protests in Metropolitan New York City have included demonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, and school boycotts since 1961. Englewood,
New Jersey, has also been a center of protests which included periodic

rallies featuring Negro celebrities, boycotts, sit-ins, and picketing at
the Governor's office in Trenton. Picketing has been utilized for

protest in Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago and St. Louis. 28 "As of

June 1963, the NAACP reported active investigation and protest of
racial segregation in the public schools of 64 school districts in 18

states29 of the North and West." 30 In a number of these school districts
relief was being sought
either in the courts or by administrative
31

appeals under state law.

B. Racial Imbalance:Its Effect an Negro Children
The protests against the racially imbalanced schools of the North
and West are based on the proposition that the Negro child is harmed
by attending this type of school. The most obvious evidence of this
proposition is the academic inadequacy of the racially imbalanced
school. There seems to be general agreement that the racially im-

balanced school is in the lowest stratum of the educational system.32
These schools are ordinarily located in the slum areas of the city, the
cultural level of the student body is exceedingly low, the physical
plants are usually out-of-date and overcrowded, discipline is a con-

tinuous problem, the teaching staff usually is inexperienced and class

size is generally disproportionately large.33 "In general the Negro

schools tend to be the worst by almost every method of measurement."3 4 A not unexpected result of these conditions is that the
educational level of the children in racially
imbalanced schools "is
35
markedly below that of their white peers."

in the North and West has not been lessened to any great degree. This failure is
attributed to the priority given by Negro political leaders to attacks on discrimination
in other facets of life rather than in the schools. Id. at 4.
28. 1963 U.S. CoMM'N ON Cvm EIGHTs REP. 53 "In Boston, some 3,000 junior and
senior high school students stayed out of school for a day and attended workshops in
neighborhood churches and social centers where they were instructed in Negro history,
U.S. Government, and civil rights, and the principles of nonviolence. In St. Louis 30
parents and ministers blocked the departure from a West End school of 12 buses
containing about 500 children who were being transported to under-utilized white
schools miles away, where they would attend all-negro classes." Id. at 53-54.
29. "The 18 states were: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington." 1963 U.S. Con'N ON Civon BIGHTs
STAPF REP., supra note 10, at 4 n.14.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Ibid.
32. Kaplan, supra note 25.
33. Fiss, supra note 8, at 569-70.
34. Kaplan, supra note 25.
35. Maslow, supra note 6, at 356. See Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (D.N.I.
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The unresolved question, however, is whether this academic deprivation results from racial separation or merely from the fact that
the racially imbalanced school is ordinarily a slum school. There are
a number of proponents of the argument that there is a causal relationship between racial imbalance and depressed motivation and
achievement in the Negro child. Fiss points out "that students in
such schools are also deprived of the intellectual stimulation that
comes from the exchange of ideas and the development of personal
relationships in a racially and socially heterogeneous context." 6 Professor Kaplan argues, however, that this causal relationship is far from
clearly established. "Indeed the only careful study reported showed
that when correction was made for social class, intelligence, and
other variables, the Negro child in an all-Negro school achieved every
bit as much as the Negro child in an integrated school."37 This differ-

ence of opinion indicates that the evidence of a causal relationship
between racial imbalance and academic deprivation remains unestablished. Certainly, a logical argument can be made that the concerted
improvement of the schools, both racially imbalanced and balanced,
in the economically depressed areas of these cities might solve many
of these problems of academic deprivation.38
Another widely accepted belief is that the Negro child is psychologically harmed by attending a racially imbalanced school. Confinement to a predominantly Negro school is felt to cause feelings of
inferiority that hamper subsequent development of the Negro child's
personality. Because the Supreme Court in Brown found that "to
separate them (Negroes) from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority . . .
unlikely ever to be undone,"39 proponents of racial balance in the
1964), where the court indicated that in the racially imbalanced school "among the
Negro pupils . . . achievement scores were lower, retentions in grade were higher,
high school records of graduates were poorer, and drop-outs among graduates were
higher, as compared with the Negro and white pupils in other elementary schools."
Id. at 31. See also Tillman, The Case Against De Facto Segregated Education in the
North and West: A Contemporary Case Study, 33 J. NEGRO EDUC. 371, 377 (1964).
36. Fiss, supranote 8, at 569-70.
37. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 175 (1963). The study referred to by Professor Kaplin
is, St. John, The Relation of Racial Segregation in Early Schooling to the Level of
Aspiration and Academic Achievement of Negro Students in a Northern High School,
1962 (thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Education of Harvard
University).
38. "It is my belief that satisfactory education can be provided in all all-Negro
schools through the expenditure of more money for needed staff and facilities." CoNANT,
SLUMS AND Sunrvs 28-29 (1961). Professor Kaplan also suggests that racial imbalance
is "a class problem rather than a racial problem." Kaplan, supra note 37, at 207.
39. Brown v. Board of Educ., supra note 1, at 494.
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schools argue analogously that racial imbalance also breeds inferiority.
This inferiority,
'stems both from the compelled association with people only of the
same
low social status and from a widely shared belief that the racially imbalanced school is the school with the lowest status in the community.' 40

Also, it is suggested that the Negro child may believe that the zoning
which produces the racially imbalanced school is in fact a tacit form
41
of segregation.
It is sufficient to note that the controversy surrounding this argument on whether this Brown-type inferiority develops because the
races are separated or because racial classifications are employed to
separate the races. If racial classification is the determinative factor,
then there is no causal relationship between racial imbalance and
this alleged psychological harm.
A more damaging aspect of racial imbalance relates to a purpose
of education which although less emphasized is fully as important
as developing the potential ability of individual pupils. This corollary
goal of education "is ...to induct the young person systematically
into the culture and society to which he is an heir and in which he
should be a partner."42 The Supreme Court recognized the importance
of this adjunct to the academic purpose of education in Brown.
"Today it (education) is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment."43
It seems clear that regardless of the cause of the separation of the
races the isolation of a minority race will prevent the achievement of
this educational goal.44 In the racially imbalanced school as well as
in the segregated school, the racial minority is deprived of equal
educational opportunity due to the lack of "educational and social
contacts and interaction" 45 with pupils of the majority race. The
relevence of racial balance in the schools to equal educational opportunity was emphasized by a report of the Advisory Committee on
40. Fiss, supra note 8, at 569.
41. "It is true that in a situation where the Negro believes that racial zoning was
used by the school authorities but is unable to prove it, one would expect that some
harm might occur-the same type of harm that may occur to anyone who incorrectly
believes that his rights have been violated." Kaplan, supra note 37, at 175.
42. FiscHER, WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 13, reported, 1963 U.S. COMiNI'N ON CIvIL
Rtcirrs STAFF REP., supra note 10, at 76.
43. Brown v. Board of Educ., supranote 1, at 493.
44. 1963 U.S. CoM'N ON CGnr BiG rs STAFF REP., supra note 10, at 78. "Only if
the ethnic composition of the schools reflects in some degree the community of which
their pupils will be a part upon the completion of their schooling, can the schools
prepare them to take their places in the world of work on terms of equality." Ibid.
45. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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Human Relations and Community Tensions to New York state's
Commissioner of Education.
The common school has long been viewed as a basic social instrument in
attaining our traditional American goals of equal opportunity and personal
fulfillment. The presence in a single school of children from varied racial,
cultural, socio-economic, and religious backgrounds is an important element
for active participation in the social
in the preparation of our young people
46
and political affairs of our democracy.

II. DOES THE CoNsTrrUnON

REQUI!E ELIMINATION OF RACIAL

IMNM

NCE?

A. RacialImbalance.CausedBy Racially Motivated Conduct
The Brown decision clearly held unconstitutional segregation imposed by sanction of law. The Supreme Court further held in Cooper
v. Aaron,4 7 that the fourteenth amendment prohibitions against racial
discrimination in the public schools,
extend to all action of the state denying equal protection of the laws:
whatever the agency of the state taking the action.., or whatever the guise
in which it is taken ... and that the constitutional right of a student not

be discriminated against in the public schools on grounds of race or color
can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state
executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive
schemes for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuosly. 48
...

The question of evasive action by school officials resulting in racial
imbalance was raised in the context of a racially imbalanced school in
49
Taylor v. Board of Education.
The city of New Rochelle has an elongated shape, with its length
from north to south being almost four times its average width. The
southern section of the city was populated first while the northern
section had only developed in recent years. Both the southern and
northern ends of the city are predominantly white while the south
central portion of the city is the major area of Negro population. The
Lincoln School District lies in the center of this Negro area. 0
In 1930, a policy of gerrymandering was instituted which led to
the confining of Negroes within the Lincoln School District by redrawing the district lines to coincide with Negro population move46. N.Y.

STATE COMM'N OF

EDuc.'s

ADVISORY COmN'N ON HumAN RELATIONS AND

Coin~ruNrry T_ sioN, GUmINo PRINcIPLEs FOR SECURING RACIAL BALANCE: IN PUBLIC
ScHooLs, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 739-40 (1963).

47. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
48. Id. at 17.
49. Supra note 45.

50. Id. at 185.
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ments, with the result that in 1949 Lincoln School was 100 per cent
Negro.51 In 1949, the School Board adopted a neighborhood school
policy by refusing further transfers and admitting new students only
to the school of the district in which they reside. Although this policy
had been in force for some time, permissive transfers had nullified
its effectiveness. Rigid enforcement of this neighborhood school
policy resulted in Lincoln Schools population being 94 per cent
Negro at the inception of this suit. 52
Although several studies of school district lines by experts both
in and out of the New Rochelle School System called for extensive
redistricting and a more flexible use of the "neighborhood school
policy," 3 the Board took no action except to propose rebuilding the
Lincoln School on its present site. "In the light of the Board's policy
of refusal to allow children to transfer to schools in other districts
this would mean a freezing of segregation at Lincoln."5 4 After this
proposal was carried by referendum vote of the New Rochelle voters
in May, 1960, this class action was instituted to restrain the School
Board from constructing the new school on the same site and also
to enjoin the Board from refusing to allow Negro students to register
in schools not segregated as well as requiring Negro students to
register in a segregated school.
In affirming the grant of the relief sought, Judge Clark clearly
differentiated the Lincoln School situation from the school which is
racially unbalanced due to a combination of residential patterns and
the "neighborhood school policy."
The Board considered Lincoln as the 'Negro' school and... district lines
were drawn and retained so as to perpetuate this condition. In short, race
was made the basis for school districting, 55with the purpose and effect of
producing a substantially segregated school.

The conduct of the School Board in gerrymandering school district
lines on the basis of race was held to have violated the fourteenth
51. "Around 1930, an area of several blocks, occupied by whites, was carved out of
the Lincoln District and added to the Daniel Webster District, even though this area
was adjacent to the Lincoln School and was a relatively long distance from the Webster
School. When Negroes later moved into this area it was restored to the Lincoln District.
... It also appears that until 1949 the Board allowed white children within the Lincoln
District to transfer to other schools . .. ." 294 F.2d at 38.
52. Ibid.

53. A professional team from Teachers College, Columbia, and the School of
Education of New York University made a report entitled "Racial Imbalance in Public
Education in New Rochelle, New York" which made strong recommendations that the
School Board act toward resolving the problems of racial imbalance in the school
system. ibid.
54. Id. at 39.
55. 1bid.
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amendment as interpreted in the Brown case. There is no distinction
between "segregation established by the formality of a dual system,
as in Brown, and that created by gerrymandering of school district
6
lines and transferring of white children as in the instant case."
The basic conflict between the litigants as to the meaning of the
Brown decision clearly illustrates the confusion which surrounds this
case. The Board argued that Lincoln School was not a component of
a dual system of education because the school was only ninety-four
per cent Negro. Judge Kaufman in the district court held that this
argument was based on a misconception of the underlying premise of
the Brown rationale.
That opinion... was premised on the factual conclusion that a segregated
education created and maintained by official acts had a detrimental and
deleterious effect on the educational and mental development of the
minority group children. The court further emphasized the necessity of
giving these minority group children the opportunity for extensive contact
with other children at an early stage in their educational experience, finding
such contact indispensable .... 57

Thus, although Lincoln School was six per cent white, it must be

considered segregated under the premise of the Brown decision.
The "presence of some 29 white children certainly does not afford
the 454 Negro children in the school the educational and social contacts and interaction envisioned by Brown."58
Judge Kaufman summarily disposed of the neighborhood school
policy argument advanced by the Board without considering its constitutionality. The neighborhood school policy is not examined in
the abstract but only in the context that it was used by the Board
to perpetuate segregation in Lincoln School.
The neighborhood school policy certainly is not sacrosanct. It is valid
only insofar as it is operated within the confines established by the Constitution. It cannot be used as an instrument to confine Negroes within an area
artificially delineated in the first instance by official acts. If it is so used, the
Constitution has been violated and the courts must intervene. 59

This case must be viewed as holding only that if a Board of Education enters into a course of conduct motivated by a purposeful desire
to perpetuate and maintain a segregated school, the constitutional
rights of those confined within this segregated establishment have
been violated. This decision does not deal with segregation resulting
56.
57.
58.
59.

191 F. Supp. at 192.

Ibid.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 195.
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from fortuitous residential patterns. Thus, the court leaves undecided
the constitutionality of "de facto segregation." 0

This principle was reaffirmed61 by a federal district court in Illinois

in Webb v. Board of Education.

It would appear that the only basis for equitable relief in this case must
(School Board)
be found in the form of an intentional design on Defendant's
62
behalf to maintain segregation in the public schools.

An even more recent case dealing with intentional gerrymandering
of school districts is Downs v. Board of Education.3 The complainant
charged the School Board with attempting to cause racial segregation
by the drawing of a boundary line between two junior high school

attendance districts. Also, the complainant protested the adoption
and implementation of a pupil transfer system which allowed a student to transfer from a school where the majority of the students
are of a different race. The Federal District Court of Kansas held
the transfer system invalid because it recognized race as a factor in

the determination of the school a student shall attend. 64 As to the
relocation of the attendance lines, the court found that the Board

had acted in good faith to make the most efficient use of facilities

by balancing the enrollment between the two schools. 65 The court

found that, with the exception of the transfer system, the overall policy
of the Board has served to effectuate a non-discriminatory school

system where each child will attend the school within the district
of his residence without regard to race.66 Therefore, the court dis-

missed the complaint in all respects except that of the transfer policy.
The Tenth Circuit 67 affirmed the action of the district court, holding
60. In a footnote the district court distinguishes "de lure" and "de facto" segregation.
"De lure" refers to segregation created or maintained by official act. "De facto segregation" is segregation resulting from fortuitous residential patterns. The court emphasized that this decision did not determine whether "de facto" segregation is violative
of the Constitution. Id. at 194 n.12.
61. 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
62. Id. at 468.
63. 9 RACE REL. L. RE.P. 1214 (D. Kan.), aff'd, 336 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1964),
review denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965). See also Craggett v. Board of Educ., 234
F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd per curiam, 338 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1964), where the
court also found no intent on the part of the school board to segregate. It is important
to note in this case that the court held that the school officials were presumed to have
properly discharged their duties.
64. Downs v. Board of Educ., 9 B.CE EL. L. Ran'. 1214 (D. Kan. 1963). See also
Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963), where the Supreme Court declared that
transfer provisions of this type not only lend themselves to the perpetuation of segregation, but can only work toward that end. Consequently, they promote racial discrimination and violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution. Id. at 687.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964).
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that the School Board was not engaged in gerrymandering of attendance area lines nor was it using arbitrary assignment procedures to
perpetuate segregation. 68 While recognizing that racial imbalance
exists in the city schools, the court found that this condition had
resulted from a good faith implementation of a neighborhood school
policy.

69

The intent of the School Board as manifested by their actions is
the crucial consideration under the Taylor doctrine. If the intent is
racially motivated, then the action of the School Board is unconstitutional. But if the court finds the acts of a School Board not racially
motivated as in Webb or Downs, then the court will sustain its
0
action.7
B. FortuitousRacial Imbalance
1. The Constitutional Violation.-The question of whether the racially imbalanced school violates rights protected by the Constitution
encompasses a highly controversial area of Constitutional law. From
a duty oriented approach the question is whether the Constitution
imposes a duty on the public educational authorities to act to ease
fortuitous separation of the races. However, approaching the problem
by considering the rights of the parties involved, the question is
whether the Negro child has a constitutional right to attend racially
balanced schools. The solution to these questions depends on an
interpretation of Brown considered in the context of prior decisions
by the Supreme Court dealing with segregated education.
In Brown, the Supreme Court clearly held that segregated schools
were unconstitutional. This decision, as were Sweatt v. Paintere1 and
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents 2 which preceeded Brown, was
predicated on the theory that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment prohibited the denial of equal educational
opportunity because of race. In the cases preceeding Brown, tangible
deprivations of this equal educational opportunity were readily apparent. In Sweatt, the superiority of the all-white law school as to
"number of faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of library, availability of law
review and similar activities,"7 3 was an unquestioned violation of equal
educational opportunity. Turning to intangible factors in Sweatt, the
68. Id. at 996.
69. Id. at 997.
70. In Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958) and Sealy v. Department
of Pub. Instruction, 159 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aft'd, 252 F.2d 898 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958), the courts also sustained action taken by the
respective school boards after finding that the acts contested were not racially motivated.
71. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
72. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
73. Sweatt v. Painter, supra note 71, at 633-34.
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Court also indicated that the Negro student received unequal treatment in that the white law school "possesses to a far greater degree
those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school."7 4 In MoLaurin, the
Supreme Court considered restrictions which forced a Negro graduate
student to remain apart from students of other races in the classrooms,
library, and cafeteria. 75 These restrictions were held to violate the
principle of equal educational opportunity in that the enforced separation impaired "his ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students, and, in general to learn his
76
profession."
In Brawn, however, none of these tangible deprivations existed,
thus the Supreme Court was forced to consider "the effect of segregation itself on public education."77 The Court reached the obvious
conclusion that public education was of such importance to the
cultural, professional and environmental development of the child
that where the state has undertaken to provide educational opportunity, this opportunity is "a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms."'78 The Court then posed and answered the question
that is the very crux of this landmark decision.
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal,
deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does ....
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community9 that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone.7

The Supreme Court concluded this decisional analysis by holding
that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."80
Eleven years after the Brown decision, the controversy concerning
the specific rationale by which the Supreme Court decided Brown
rages anew. Imposition of a duty to alleviate racial imbalance depends on what Brown held to constitute a deprivation of equal educational opportunity. The fact that legal scholars have not agreed as
to what constituted the violation of equal educational opportunity in
Brown explains their varying posture as to the duty to act to ease
74. Id. at 633.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra note 72, at 640.
Id. at 641.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,492 (1954).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 495.
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racial imbalance. 81 A later examination of decisions from the state
and federal courts dealing with racial imbalance will reveal this same
division of opinion as to the meaning of Brown with the comcommittent variance of opinion as to the validity of the racially imbalanced
school.
One view of the Brown rationale emphasizes the Court's examination of the tangible and intangible inequalities of segregated education
in Sweatt, McLaurin and Brown. Under this theory, a showing of
substantial and unjustified inequality is necessary to establish a
violation of the equal educational opportunity espoused in Brown.82
Obviously the validity of the sociological evidence of inequality resulting from segregated education assumes great importance under
this theory.83 The logical transition to the racially imbalanced situation is provided by the statement in Brown that "separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."84 The argument is then advanced
that since it is separate education that breeds inequality, the racially
imbalanced school fails to provide this constitutionally required equal
educational opportunity. Where there is such a clear showing of inequality between the racial imbalanced and balanced schools of a
community that the use of geographic criteria for zoning cannot be
justified, the public educational authorities would have a duty to
attempt to ease racial imbalance. "The school board is obliged to
remedy only the harmful imbalance that is also unjustified."8 5
The opposing theory as to the rationale of the equal educational
opportunity principle is that the decisions in Sweatt, McLaurin and
Brown all rest on the principle that separation by race is an inherently arbitrary classification that may not, within the confines of
constitutional equal educational opportunity, be employed by government to separate one group of students from another.86 Proponents of
81. See Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HAnv. L. REv. 564, 590-95 (1965); Kaplan, supra note 37, at 171-74.
82. "In each case a court will be called upon to decide whether the racial imbalance
that exists in the schools of a particular community results in a systematically and
substantially inferior educational opportunity for Negroes. No matter how conscientious
the court that decides this question, an irreducible amount of uncertainty will remain."
Fiss, supranote 81, at 595-96.
83. Although the sociological evidence presented in Brown assumes crucial importance
under this theory, Professor Kaplan argues that this evidence "was by no means
sufficiently definite, unambiguous, uncontradicted, or sweeping to allow the court to
find as a fact, irrefutable in all future cases .. . even deliberate state-imposed segregation in schools would work such harm on Negro children as to require a finding of
unconstitutionality." Kaplan, supra note 37, at 173. Accord, Black, The Lawfulness of
the Segregation Decisions,69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
84. Supra note 80.
85. Fiss, supranote 81, at 613.
86. For the best statement of this theory see Kaplan, supra note 37, at 171-74.
For a different interpretation of this theory, see Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to ProfessorWechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).

1304

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

this theory argue that the language indicating tangible and intangible
inequality in Sweatt, McLaurin,and Brown was used for two reasons.
First, because the Court was not prepared to overrule Plessy v.
Ferguson,87 it was necessary to show the Negro plaintiffs in these
cases would prevail under the Plessy rule. Second, this sociological
evidence of inequality was used merely to buttress the holding that
inherently arbitrary classifications violated equal educational opportunity. In relegating the showing of inequality in Brown to the background, Professor Kaplan maintains that,
The Supreme Court has never held that in the absence of some racial

classification the mere inequality of one school compared with another
involves a constitutional violation. In many communities one school is
clearly better in terms of faculty, student body, physical facilities, and
prestige than others, yet no one has suggested that this inequality raises a
federal constitutional question. If pure inequality were the essence of the
constitutional violation, such schools might in some ways be much more
unequal and inferior than many schools segregated by force of law. 88

Under the rationale of Brown, there would seem to be no duty to
act to alleviate fortuitous racial imbalance because in the racially
imbalanced school the separation of the races is not a result of racial
classification. Thus, under the inherently arbitrary classification theory,
mere racial imbalance does not constitute a deprivation of equal
educational opportunity.
While the latter rationale of the Brown decision has been utilized
in the majority of courts that have examined the validity of racially
imbalanced schools, a few courts have followed the view that separation of the races with attendant, unjustified inequality violates a
constitutional mandate for equal educational opportunity. In most
instances the action of this small minority of courts seems to have
been motivated by extremely strong findings of educational inequality
in these imbalanced schools. 89 Thus, until the Supreme Court clarifies
this controversy as to the basis of the Brown decision, the possibility
of a court finding a duty to reduce racial imbalance depends to a
great degree on the ability of the plaintiff's attorneys to emphasize
87. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This case established the famous "separate but equal"
doctrine that was used to test validity of the segregated school until the Brown
decision.
88. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part11: The Great Northern Probler, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 172 (1963). Supplementing this argument is the fact that
subsequent to the Brown decision the Supreme Court struck down segregation in golf
courses, Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), and in parks, New Orleans
City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958), without expressly or
impliedly finding any of the type of harm which some writers feel was determinative
in Brown.
89. See Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
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from the academic, psychological, and cultural standpoints, the inequalities of the racially imbalanced school. A closer examination of
the cases will reveal, however, that several courts have found no
constitutional violation where the racially imbalanced school is found
grossly unequal in all respects to neighboring racially balanced schools.
2. The JudicialResponse- (a). Presumption of Unconstitutionality.
-In Evans v. Buchanan,90 Negro children petitioned for an order allowing them to transfer from their all-Negro school to an integrated
school. The court found that because this was an all-Negro student
and faculty school administered by its own separate Boards of
Trustees, and surrounded by predominantly white attendance areas,
"the controlling public attendance plan is subject to careful scrutiny
and the promulgators of the plan should have the duty of justification."91 The court placed the burden of proof on the Delaware State
Board of Education, holding that "a presumption of unconstitutionality
arises under this set of facts."92 The court justified this extra burden
for the defendant on two grounds that, "first, the basic facts are
highly probative of the presumed fact. Secondly, the evidence, in
great part, rests in the hands of those who conceived and implemented
93
the plan."
After the State Board of Education presented its proof,94 the court
found the evidence did not rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality by showing that the plan of school attendance areas was
justified as rational and nondiscriminatory. Therefore, it was ordered
that the petitioning school children be admitted to the integrated

school.
The Evans court squarely rejected the petitioners' arguments that
the School Board must take affirmative action to provide Negroes with
an "integrated education" or even that they must consider the factor
of race in setting up school districts.9 5 The court held that de facto
segregation was not prohibited by the Constitution and that the state
had no affirmative duty to integrate.9 6
90. 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962).
91. Id. at 825.
92. Ibid. The Court suggests that this type of presumption is not limited to this set
of facts. It might be employed in other factual circumstances. The court indicates that
the one fact of an all negro student body might be sufficient to justify the invocation
of the presumption, however, the court makes no decision as to this question. Id. at
825 n.12.
93. Id. at 825.
94. The Board's only witness testified that only facilities, location and access roads
were considered in drawing up the plan. This was, in essence, all the Board offered
in justification. Id. at 825 n.14.
95. Id. at 823.
96. This holding was based on an interpretation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment as a "prohibition preventing the states from applying their
laws unequally" rather than a clause which compelled affirmative action. Ibid.
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Although this decision does not vitiate true de facto segregation,
it makes official segregation disguised as de facto segregation no longer
possible. The crucial result of this decision was to make the constitutionality of the Board's zoning action a question of fact 97 reserved

for detailed scrutiny. Simultaneously, the presumption of unconstitutionality shifts the burden of justification to the School Board.98
Although official action by public officers, including school boards,
is ordinarily presumed to be legally performed, 99 courts in segregation
cases have been less willing to accept school desegregation plans
without an independent analysis of the factors involved. Although
acceptance or rejection of the plans has not been phrased in terms of
presumption or burden of proof, the approach is analogous to Evans.'
Although pure de facto segregation will not be prevented by the
Evans approach, this approach avoids the evidentiary problems of
showing an intent to segregate, and it strikes at discrimination, the
results of which are similar to de facto segregation. It may also
provide a stimulus for school boards to meet and deal with these
problems. But the effect of the opinion on segregationist practices
will depend upon the burden placed upon and evidence required of
the Board. The court failed to specify adequately the facts upon
which the presumption will arise and did not consider whether the
burden of persuasion or only the burden of production had been
shifted to the Board. The court spoke only of the duty of justification
required of the Board.1 1 If only the burden of production was shifted
and petitioners retain the burden of persuasion, they gain little advantage, for this is the position they would normally occupy if they
had merely presented enough evidence for the court to draw an
inference of segregation.
(b). No Duty To Ease Racial Imbalance.-The basic question left
unanswered in the Brown case was whether the states have an affirmative duty to provide Negroes with an integrated education. The first
97. Id. at 825.
98. See McComc, EvmmcN. 641 (1954); 9 WIGMOrE, EVIDENCE § 2534 (3d ed.
1940),
09. See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962); Jones v.
School Bd., 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 203 F. Supp. 843
(E.D. Tenn. 1962).
100. For example, in Northcross, supra note 99, the court held the Tennessee Pupil
Assignment Law inadequate to convert a segregated system into a nonracial one. Id.
at 821. The burden rested with school authorities to initiate desegregation, and
Negro children were not required to apply for that to which they were entitled as a
matter of right. The court found that a segregated school system existed in fact and
that the Board had not acted under the assignment law toward establishing nonracial schools. Id. at 823. The Board was to submit a realistic plan for the organization
of its schools on a nonracial basis. Id. at 824.
101. Evans v. Buchanan, supra note 90, at 825.
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case which directly considered this question was Evans v. Buchanan.02
The Federal District Court of Delaware held in this case that the
states were not required by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution to provide an integrated education for Negro children. 0 3 This conclusion was based on
a narrow interpretation which restricted the Brown rationale to
situations in which Negroes were separated solely on the basis of
their race.0 4 Therefore, the court concluded that if races are separated
because of geographic or transportation considerations or other similar
criteria, it is no concern of the federal constitution. Thus, discrimination is forbidden but integration is not compelled.0 5
Despite the Evans holding that the Brown decision did not affirmatively require integration, the court deemed it necessary to consider
the fact of separation of races because the crux of the Brown decision
was involved with the harmful effects on Negro children of being
forced to attend separate schools. The court dealt with this problem
in three ways. First it indicated that the harmful psychological effects
probably did not result where Negroes "have not been discriminated
against, as such, but who merely live near each other."'0 6 The tenuous
nature of this proposition is emphasized by the absence of any authority supporting it. Secondly, the court pointed out that if any of
these deleterious effects are suffered by the Negro children they are
outweighed by "the dangers of children unnecessarily crossing streets,
the inconvenience of traveling great distances and of overcrowding
and of other possible consequences of ensuring mixed schools." 0 7 The
court seems here to invent straw men and then destroy them for
none of these problems were raised in this case. The problem of
crossing streets does not seem insurmountable, nor does that of
providing additional methods of transportation. The court does not
102. Supra note 90. Before this case the duty to racially balance the schools had
only been referred to in dictum in the context of litigation involving the southern
school. See Thompson v. Arlington School Bd., 144 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,
240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957), where the court said:
"It must be remembered that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education do not compel the mixing of the different races in the
public schools. No general reshuffling of the schools in any school system has been
commanded. The order of that court is simply that no child shall be denied admission
to a school on the basis of race or color." 144 F. Supp. at 240.
103. 207 F. Supp. at 823.
104. This interpretation is based on Chief Justice Warren's statement in the Brown
case, where speaking for the court he said: "To separate the Negroes from others .. .
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may never be undone." 347 U.S. at 494 (1954) (Emphasis added).
105. 207 F. Supp. at 823-24.
106. Id. at 824.
107. Ibid. Here the court seems to be justifying racial imbalance on the basis of
these factors. This procedure is consistent with Fiss's theory of equal educational
opportunity.
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reveal what these "other consequences" of mixing the races are, but
it is obvious that they did not concern the Supreme Court in the
Brown case. Thirdly, the Evans court concluded that the cure for
this problem "rests in elimination of its roots. The problems in this
case grew out of segregated housing."108
The effect of the Evans decision is weakened somewhat by the fact
that the court allowed the transfer from the imbalanced school
despite holding there is no duty to integrate. Regardless of the
language employed by the Evans court, the use of the presumption of
unconstitutionality results in a duty to integrate which may be
negated only by the positive showing that racial discrimination was
not a factor in establishing school zones.
A similar view that there was no affirmative duty to integrate was
adopted in Bell v. School City,10 9 where the plaintiffs brought an
action for declaratory judgment against the city of Gary, Indiana,
seeking a determination as to whether they "have a constitutional
right to attend racially integrated schools and whether the defendant
has a constitutional duty to provide and maintain a racially integrated
school system."" 0 The federal district court answered most emphatically in the negative, finding Brown applicable only to racially motivated assignments.
In the school year 1961-1962 there were 43,090 students enrolled in
the Gary public schools, 53.5 per cent of whom were Negroes. They
were distributed among the forty schools in the school system as
follows:
10,710 of the students... attended fourteen schools which were 100 per
cent white; 16,242 attended twelve schools which were populated from 99 to
100 per cent by Negroes; 6,981 students attended five schools which were
from 77 to 95 per cent Negroes; 4,066 attended four schools which had a
range from 13 to 37 per cent Negro; 5,465 attended five schools which had
a Negro population from one to five per cent.111

The court rebutted the plaintiffs contention that there was an
affirnmative duty to integrate, holding that "the fact that certain
schools are completely or predominantly Negro does not mean
that the defendant maintains a segregated school system."" 2 Rather,
108. 207 F. Supp. at 824.
109. 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). See Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part
III: The Gary Doctrine, 59 Nw. U.L.

BEiv.

121 (1964), for an excellent discussion of

this case.
110. 213 F. Supp. at 820.
111. Ibid.
112. Id. at 828. This view is reiterated in Webb v. Board of Educ., supra note 61.
This was a class action by parents of Negro children for injunctive relief against the
maintenance of racially segregated public schools. The court overruled the injunction
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a segregated school is one to which admittance is compelled or
denied on the arbitrary basis of race. 113
The court also looked to the social, cultural and administrative
advantages of the neighborhood school system and, although admitting
that this system causes racial imbalance, suggests that,
nothing in . . . the law requires that a school system developed on the
neighborhood school plan, honestly and conscientiously constructed with no
intention or purpose to segregate the races, must be destroyed or abandoned
because the resulting effect is to have a racial imbalance in certain schools
where the district is populated almost entirely by Negroes or whites. On
the other hand, there are many expressions to the contrary, and these
expressions lead me to believe that racial balance in our public schools is
not constitutionally mandated. 114

After considering the Brown decision

sions," 6

15

and its implementing deci-

the court held "that the Supreme Court intended that the

desegregation policy was to be carried out within the framework
because there was a substantial question of fact as to whether the segregation complained of is the result of an active and intentional design. The court followed the
Bell case and held that a showing of de facto segregation did not sustain plaintiff's
burden. "School segregation resulting from residential segregation, alone, is not a
violation of any right over which this court can take cognizance." Id. at 468.
113. Bell v. School City, supra note 109, at 829. It is significant to note that judge
Beamer did not employ the Evans view of the burden of proof. Rather in Bell as to
the motivation of the School Board the plaintiffs had the burden of persuasion. Due to
the closeness of the facts in Bell, if the fact of racial imbalance had shifted the burden
to the School Board, it is not mere conjecture to suggest that the result might have
been different.
114. 213 F. Supp. at 829.
115. In the original Brown opinion, the Supreme Court considered the case for
further argument as to how its decision should be implemented. One of the questions
for re-argument was:
"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.
'(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that within the limits set by
normal geographic districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools
of their choice."' 347 U.S. at 298 n.2.
116. In carrying out the instructions of the Supreme Court, a three-judge District
Court in Kansas said:
"It was stressed at the hearing that such schools as Buchanan are all colored schools
and that in them there is no intermingling of colored and white children. Desegregation does not mean that there must be intermingling of the races in all school districts.
It means only that they may not be prevented from intermingling or going to school
together because of race or color." Brown v. Board of Educ., 39 F. Supp. 468, 470
(D. Kan., 1955).
In Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), one of the original segregation cases, the court on remand merely enjoined the Board from refusing to admit any
child otherwise qualified to any school under its supervision on account of race. The
court indicated that this was all Brown required and stated in dicta, since widely
quoted, that "the Constitution . . . does not require integration. It merely forbids
discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary
action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power for enforced segregation."
Id. at 777.
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of 'school districts and attendance areas."" 1 7 Citing language from
the Evans case indicating that integration is not compelled where only
racial imbalance is involved, the court concluded that there is no
support for the plaintiff's contention "that the defendant has an
affirmative duty to balance the races ... regardless of the residence
of students involved."" 8 The Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal in
an opinion adopting the general thesis and some of the language of
the district court."9
A federal district court in Ohio adopted the Bell rationale in
Lynch v. Kenston School District.20 The court held that the plaintiffs
have no right to attend an affimatively integrated school and that
de facto segregation caused by good faith adherence to a neighborhood school policy violates no constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs have a constitutional right not to be objects of racial discrimination, and they can vindicate that right in an action before this court but
they do not have a constitutional right to attend or to refrain from attending a
particular school on the basis of racial considerations when there has been
no actual discrimination against them.' 2 '

The most recent case expounding the Bell view that there is no
affirmative duty to integrate is a Tenth Circuit decision, Downs v.

Board of Education.'22 In this case the court clearly recognized that
there was drastic racial imbalance in the public schools of Kansas
City.

The record shows that, as of April 13, 1962, there was a total of 7,467
Negro children in the elementary, junior high, and senior high schools.
Almost 73 per cent of these children, or 5,405, attended the nine schools
which were predominantly Negro. The remaining 27 per cent, or 2,062
children, attended 26 integrated schools . . . . The schools located the
nearest to the concentration of Negro population had the highest percentage
of Negro pupils and the schools the greatest distance123 away from that
concentration were composed entirely of white students.

The complaint in the class action brought by fifteen Negro children
against the school officials alleged that the "total policy" of the
School Board tended toward the maintenance of a discriminatory
117. 213 F. Supp. at 830.
118. Id. at 831.
119. 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
120. 229 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1964).

121. Id. at 744.
122. Supra note 63. For even more recent decisions finding no duty to act to reduce
racial imbalance, see Bradley v. School Bd., Civil No. 9626, 4th Cir. April 7, 1965;
Gilliam v. School Bd., Civil No. 9471, 4th Cir., April 7, 1965.
123. 336 F.2d at 996.
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school system. 12 4 This argument was rejected by Judge Hill with
5
an exception as to the transfer policy which was enjoined. 12 The
appellants then argued that despite the court's finding that the Board
was not employing a policy of intentional segregation, there was

segregation in fact in the school system and that the Brown decision
imposed an "affirmative duty to eliminate segregation in fact as well

as segregation by intention."2 6 With the Bell decision as precedent
the court maintained that the fourteenth amendment is a prohibition

against segregation but not a mandate for integration of the races in
public schools. "Negro children have no constitutional right to have

white children attend school with them." 127 The court suggests, as

did the Bell court, that where racial imbalance is caused by the

neighborhood school plan 128 the School Board need not abandon129the

system as long as there is no intention to perpetuate segregation.
(c). A Duty To Ease Racial Imbalance.-(1) Administrative Decisions.-Until 1963, administrative decisions concerning racial imbalance
had uniformily held that affirmative measures to overcome racial im-

balance were not legally required.

30

Then, on May 15, 1963, the

New Jersey Commissioner of Education handed down the landmark
decision of Fisher v. Board of Education.13' This decision maintained
that "extreme racial imbalance' 32 . . . at least where means exist to

prevent it, constitutes under New Jersey law133 a deprivation of educa34
tional opportunity for the pupils compelled to attend the school."'
Soon after the Fisher decision, the New Jersey Commissioner of
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 994.
Supra note 64.
336 F.2d at 998.
Ibid. See also Kelley v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ.,
333 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1964); Evers v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 328 F.2d
408 (5th Cir. 1964); Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960).
128. "Neighborhood school systems . . . by which admission to the school is determined upon the basis of similar criteria such as residence and aptitude, are in use in
many parts of the country. They have been successfully challenged on constitutional
grounds where operated in such a way as to discriminate against students because of
their race or color.... In the absence of a showing that such school systems are being
used to deprive a student of his constitutional rights, they are not objectionable on
constitutional grounds." 336 F.2d at 995.
129. See also Northeross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 944 (1962); Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961).
130. See In the Matter of Bell, 77 N.Y. D,'aT R. 37 (Comm'n Educ. 1956).
OREL. L. RE'. 730 (1963).
131. 8 l.c
132. Oakwood School was found by the court to be 99% Negro. Id. at 733.
133. The court was referring here to the New Jersey Constitution.
"No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be
discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segregated
in the militia or in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry
or national origin. N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
134. 8 RACE REL. L. EP. at 734.
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1 35
Education rendered two decisions, Booker v. Board of Education
36
and Spruill v. Board of Education, which closely followed the
Fisher rationale. In Booker, the Commissioner held that the school
board has a duty to eliminate racial imbalance in schools in regard
to which a reasonable remedy consistent with sound educational and
administrative practice exists.3a Considering the effect of this policy
of preventing racial imbalance, on the neighborhood school policy, the
Commissioner in Spruill maintained that the neighborhood school
policy "is not to be applied inflexibly when other considerations outweigh its values."' 38
During this same period the New York Commissioner of Education
also ruled in Mitchell v. Board of Education,139 that local school boards
had a duty to act to reduce racial imbalance. On the basis of recommendations of a special advisory committee, the Commissioner ruled
that imbalance itself constitutes a deprivation of equality of educational opportunity contrary to state policy.140 This determination was
tested in the New York courts and held invalid at the trial court
level in Vetere v. Allen.' 41 The Commissioner's original decision, however, was sustained by the Appellate Division in Vetere v. Mitchell.4 '
(2) Judicial Proceedings.-Although the majority of courts have
found that racial imbalance per se presents no question of constitutional deprivation, contentions to the contrary are found in both
federal and state decisions. This minority view is expounded by the
federal courts in two opinions of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, Branche v. Board of Education43
and Blocker v. Board of Education,144 and in a recent decision by the
Federal District Court of Massachusetts, Barksdale v. Springfield
School Comm. 45 In the state courts, a similar decision has been
reached by the California Supreme Court in Jackson v. PasadenaCity
146
School District.
These cases are the sole judicial support for the theory that school
administrators have a constitutional duty to take steps to alleviate
racial imbalance even where it is not caused by racially motivated

135. 8 RAcE REL.L. REP. 1228 (1963).
136. 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1234 (1963).
137. 8 RACE REL.L. REP. at 1231.
138. 8 RAcE EEL.L. REp. at 1238.
139. 8 RAcEREL. L. REP.735 (1963).
140. Id. at 737.
141. 41 Misc. 2d 200, 245 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
142. 21 App. Div. 2d 561, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1964).
143. 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
144. 226 F. Supp. 208, remedy considered on rehearing, 229 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y.
1964).
145. 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), reversed.
146. 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878 (1963).
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conduct. The strength of this authority is weakened somewhat
because in both New York district court opinions there was some
indication that the racial imbalance was a result of racially motivated
conduct. In the Jackson case the conduct was clearly racially motivated, and thus the statement that the "school boards must take
steps
cause

. to alleviate racial imbalance in schools regardless of its
."47 was merely dictum.

. .
.

Branche v. Board of Education148 was an action by Negro residents
of Hempstead, New York. The complaint alleged maintenance of
racially segregated schools with restriction of Negro children to these
schools, and sought an injunction against these practices. More
specifically, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin enlargement of two predominantly Negro schools in the district. 49 The Board of Education
had adopted official school zone boundaries in 1949 when Jackson
and Franklin Schools were respectively 16.5 and 14.3 per cent Negro.
By 1961 the percentage had shifted to 77 and 78 per cent respectively.
Defendants' contention, supported by the affidavit of the Superintendent of Schools, was that defendants had not in any way been
responsible for maintaining segregated education in the district
through gerrymandering of school boundary zones or any other
method. It was argued that the racial imbalance resulted solely from
the residential pattern of the district. 50
The case came before the court on defendant's motion for a summary judgment. In denying this motion the court said:
Defendants show facts compatible with an absence of responsibility on
their part for the racial segregation that exists in the schools but these facts
do not demonstrate that there has been no segregation because of race.
Segregated education is inadequate and when that inadequacy is attributable

to state action it is a deprivation of a constitutional right.' 5 '

Because of the conflicts in the facts and because there was a real
question as to whether racial segregation existed in this school district, the court properly dismissed the motion. However, in dictum
the court went much further, indicating that there is an affirmative
duty to alter racial imbalance. "That it is not coerced by direct
action of an arm of the state cannot, alone, be decisive of the issue
of deprivation of constitutional right."'52 Further expounding this
theory, the court states:
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 881, 382 P.2d at 882.
Supra note 143.
Ibid.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 153.
Ibid.
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So here, it is not enough to show that residence accounts for the face of
segregation and to contend that therefore segregation is ineluctable. The
effort to mitigate the consequent educational inadequacy has not been made
and to forego that effort to deal with the inadequacy is to impose it in the
absence of a conclusive demonstration that no circumstantially possible
What is involved here is not
effort can effect any significant mitigation.
53
convenience but constitutional language.'

Although this is seemingly strong language requiring affirmative
action, Judge Dooling robs it of its clarity with several statements
which indicate that the School Board's inaction was perhaps a manifestation of an intent to maintain a racially unbalanced system.
Failure to deal with a condition as really inflicts it as does any grosser
imposition of it .

. .

. It is unavoidably the responsibility of the courts,

however, to isolate forbidden principle and require its exclusion from the
action of the educational authorities .

. .

. It cannot be said at this stage

that the 1949 adoption of the geographical rule of school attendance was
necessarily free of an unpermitted effect on constitutional interests or that
segregation
adherence to it in changing circumstances that perhaps increased
154
has not become an infringement of constitutional interests.

These statements permit a reasonable argument that Judge Dooling's
holding was directed toward a racially motivated school system. At
least one court, the Northern District Court of Illinois in Webb v.
Board of Education,155 has so interpreted the Branche case. There the
court held that Branche indicted the "passive refusal to redistrict unreasonable boundaries"5 6 and that the Branche case clearly indicated
15 7
that "mere residential segregation is not enough."
In Blocker v. Board of Education,5 8 the School Board of Manhasset, New York, had assigned children to schools in accordance
with a rigid neighborhood school plan. However, due to residential
patterns which developed after the attendance zones were established,
the enrollment in one of the three elementary schools was 99 per cent
Negro while the other two were attended solely by white children.15
The plaintiffs contended that regardless of the cause of the segregation the racial imbalance in the Valley School was segregation of
the type declared unconstitutional by the Brown decision. They
contended that this segregation resulted because of the rigid application of the defendant's neighborhood school policy and operated to
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Ibid.
Ibid..
223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
Id. at 468-69.
Ibid.
Supra note 144. See Kaplan, supra note 109, at 161-62.
226 F. Supp. at 211.
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deprive children of minority groups of equal educational oppor-

tunity.6 0 The defendants maintained that in this factual situation

the theory of the Brown case did not apply. In Manhasset, they

argued, the neighborhood school policy is color blind and any racial
imbalance which might occur is a fortuitous circumstance resulting
solely from the pattern of housing. Thus, the School Board main-

tained161that the plaintiffs showed no violation of their constitutional

right.
Judge Zavatt viewed the mandate of the Brown decision much
more broadly than did the Briggs court in its implementing decision.

Recognizing that Brown involved a factual situation different from
that before this court, Judge Zavatt said:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not cease to operate once the narrow
confines of the Brown type situation are exceeded . . . . Viewed in this
context then, can it be said, that one type of segregation, having its basis
in state law or evasive schemes to defeat integregation, is to be proscribed,
cause, is to be condoned?
while another having the same effect but another
162
Surely, the Constitution is made of stronger stuff.

Judge Zavatt then examined the neighborhood school and, although
recognizing its advantages 163 in certain circumstances, concluded that
both educators and courts have agreed that in other circumstances
by
the advantages of the neighborhood school policy are outweighed
164
its disadvantages, and rigid adherence thereto must yield.
Despite Judge Zavatt's language in interpreting the Brown decision
and in considering the neighborhood school policy which indicates
that there might be an affirmative duty to integrate, Judge Zavatt
dispells this conclusion in finding that the Manhasset School District
is segregated.
The facts in the instant case present a situation that goes far beyond
racial imbalance. It is not unreasonable to draw from the evidence in this
case the inference that the small nucleus of white children at the Valley
School will soon disappear. But upon the facts as they exist today, the
separation of 100% of the Negro children, from 99.2% of the white children
approximates closely the total separation condemned in Brown.... Neither
160. Id. at 217.
161. Id. at 218.
162. Id. at 223.
163. Ibid. The court maintains the most obvious advantages of the neighborhood
school policy are easy access and the feasibility of lunch at home. Although the
administrative officials of the Manhasset School System argued strongly that a homogenous student body was an advantage of the neighborhood school policy, this theory
was contradicted by the view of the teaching staff which felt that each elementary
school should have a culturally, socially and economically heterogeneous student
population. Id. at 223-24.
164. The "other circumstances" Judge Zavatt alludes to in this case are extreme
imbalance and gross educational inequality.
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that even
Taylor . . . nor Bell . . . presented a separation of the races
15
approaches that existing in the Manhasset School District.

The distinctive factor in this case seems to be in the factual interrelationship between segregation and racial imbalance in the Manhasset School District. Here the court found that this racially im-

balanced school was segregated but not simply because it was
racially imbalanced. Judge Zavatt determined that racial imbalance

added to school board passiveness was tantamount to segregation.
On the facts of this case, the separation of the Negro elementary school
children is segregation. It is segregation by law-the law of the School Board.
In light of the existing facts, the continuance of the Defendant Board's
impenetrable166 attendance lines amounts to nothing less than state imposed
segregation.

The court further indicated exactly what it intended to decide
and not to decide.
The court does not hold that the neighborhood school policy per se is
unconstitutional. It does hold that this policy is not immutable. It does
not hold that racial imbalance and segregation are synonymous or that
racial imbalance not tantamount to segregation is violative of the Constitution. It does hold that by maintaining and perpetuating a segregated school
system the defendant board has transgressed the prohibitions of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court does not hold
that the Constitution requires a compulsive distribution of school children
on the basis of race in order to achieve a proportional representation of
white and Negro children in each elementary school within a school district.
There is no authority to support the claim of the plaintiffs. There is not
presented here the question as to whether or not such compulsive distribution, though not required, may be permitted under the Constitution or by
state law.167

It is difficult to assess the effect of this decision on the affirmative
duty to integrate. Some writers 68 have indicated that this decision
does not recognize an affirmative duty, but follows the Taylor
rationale. The court's analysis of its own decision adds to this view.
However, it is significant that the court never clearly indicated any
acts that were racially motivated. Here there was only a sharp
separation of the races compounded by the failure of the School

Board to act to correct this imbalance. Although the court indicated
that the failure of the School Board to act could have been racially

motivated, this was not established other than by an implication due
165.
166.
167.
168.

226 F. Supp. at 225.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 230.
See Note, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 464 (1964).
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to the gross racial imbalance in this school district. Although the
court purports to adhere to the Taylor theory, this case seems to
weaken the test for racially motivated conduct to a level co-existent
with an affirmative duty to integrate where a school district has
grossly disproportionate racial imbalance.
However, an unequivocal decision was reached by the Federal
District Court of Massachusetts in Barksdale v. Springfield School
Committee.'6 9 Although the question of deliberate intent on the part
of the school authorities to segregate the races was raised as in
Branche and Blocker, unlike those cases Judge Sweeny clearly found
no such deliberate intent to segregate. "If segregation exists, it results
from a rigid adherence to the neighborhood plan of school attend70
ance."1
Evidence was introduced to show that due to the organization of
attendance zones according to the neighborhood plan, seven of
Springfield's thirty-seven elementary schools had a majority of colored
students. Also, Negro students were concentrated in one of the eight
junior high schools. This imbalance was particularly revealing because eighty per cent of Springfield's total population is white. As a
result of these facts, judge Sweeny held that "a non-white attendance
of appreciably more than fifty per cent in any one school is tanta7
mount to segregation."' '
In addition to evidence of imbalance, evidence was also introduced
to show the detrimental effects of racial imbalance on Negro children.172 On the basis of this evidence, Judge Sweeny made the
crucial finding that the Negro child in the racially imbalanced
school is deprived of equal educational opportunities.
Since the court found both racial imbalance and ensuing harm
caused by racial imbalance, the only remaining consideration was
whether this amounted to a constitutional violation. Judge Sweeny
169. Supra note 145.
170. 237 F. Supp. at 544.
171. Ibid. Where the general population of a school district is more racially imbalanced, most likely the definition of racial imbalance would have to be changed
to reflect the realities of the situation. For example, the definition used in this case
simply would not be adequate in some school districts in New York City. "Threequarters of the school children of Manhattan are Negro and Puerto-Rican; two-fifths
of the school children in greater New York are Negro and Puerto-Rican." Glazier,
Is Integration Possible in the New York Schools?, in INTEGRATON Vs. SEGREGATION
186, 190 (Humphrey ed. 1964).
172. "I find that those schools in which the vast majority of Negro students are
enrolled consistently rank lowest in achievement ratings. . . . Those students, when
transferred to other schools, had difflculty keeping abreast with their contemporaries.
Special programs in science and French for gifted children who have attained a high
achievement level have had few, and sometimes no, Negro participants." 237 F.
Supp. at 546.
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answered this question by the manner in which he phrased the

question.
The question is whether there is a constitutional duty to provide equal
educational opportunities for all children within the system. While Brown
answered that question affirmatively in the context of coerced segregation,
the constitutional fact-the inadequacy of segregated education-is the same
in this case and I so find. It is neither just nor sensible to proscribe segregation having its basis in affirmative state action while at the same time failing
to provide a remedy for segregation which grows out of discrimination in
This is not to imply that
housing, or other economic or social factors ....
the neighborhood school policy per se is unconstitutional, but that173it must
be abandoned or modified when it results in segregation in fact.
The rationale of this case illustrates that a strong showing of
inequality in the racially imbalanced school may well result in a

violation of the principle of "equal educational opportunity." Under
this theory where the protesting parents can show a causal relationship

between racial imbalance and inferior educational opportunities,
school officials may be required to act to alleviate racial imbalance.

On one occasion plaintiffs protesting racial imbalance in a state
court were also successful. Thus, in Jackson v. Pasadena City School
7 4 the Negro plaintiff sought to transfer away from a racially
District,'

imbalanced school and alleged in his complaint that defendant School
Board had arbitrarily gerrymandered school zone boundaries for the

175
The
purpose of perpetuating and intensifying racial segregation.

Supreme Court of California followed the Taylor reasoning and held

176
that the complaint alleged a clear violation of a constitutional right.

Then the court added gratuitously that,
even in the absence of gerrymandering or other affirmative discriminatory
conduct by a school board, a student under some circumstances would be
entitled to relief where, by reason of residential segregation, substantial
Residential segregation is in
racial imbalance exists in his school ....
itself an evil which tends to frustrate the youth in the area and to cause
antisocial attitudes and behavior. Where such segregation exists it is not
enough for a school board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory conduct.
The harmful influence on the children will be reflected and intensified in the
classroom if school attendance is determined on a geographic basis without
corrective measures. The right to an equal opportunity for education and
the harmful consequences of segregation require that school boards take
feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools
steps, insofar as reasonably
177
regardless of its cause.
173. Ibid.
174. Supra note 146.
175. Id. at 878, 382 P.2d at 880.
176. Ibid. "The averments with respect to racial segregation and gerrymandering
should be treated on general demurrer as allegations of ultimate facts and not mere
conclusions of law." Ibid.
177. 59 Cal. 2d at 881, 382 P.2d at 881-82.
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Although this statement is dictum, it seems clear that the California
court will, if presented with a case of racial imbalance devoid of racial
motivation, declare, as it suggested in this case, an affirmative duty to
integrate. In such a case the court would weigh a number of competing factors in reaching its decision.
Consideration must be given to the various factors in each case including
the practical necessities of governmental operation. For example, consideration should be given on the one hand, to the degree of racial imbalance
in the particular school and the extent to which it affects the opportunity
for education, and on the other hand, to such matters as the difficulty
and effectiveness of revising school boundaries so as to eliminate segregation

and the availability of other facilities to which students can be transferredY' 8

These considerations indicate that this duty to integrate is not of the
same nature as the Brown duty to not segregate. Although the court
recognized the evil of de facto segregation, it also recognized that
in some situations the problems to be entailed in reducing this racial
imbalance have no simple solution.'7 9 The question whether racial
imbalance in California can be resolved under the Jackson rationale,
however, is yet to be decided.

III. MAY EDUCATIONAL AuoTHOR Es VOLUNTARILY ELIMINATE
RACIAL IMBALANCE?
A. The Colorblind Constitution

Since the New Rochelle litigation in 1961, many school officials
have become aware of the educational problems stemming from racial
imbalance. In most cases, the racially imbalanced school is inferior in
physical plant, facilities, and in the ability and number of its teachers.
The schools in which the vast majority of Negro children are enrolled
consistently rank lowest in achievement tests. Also there is a strong
sociological belief that this racial separation is particularly harmful
to the minority race. Due to a cognizance of these adverse results of
racial imbalance, a number of school systems have voluntarily acted
to eradicate the racially imbalanced school. This action has been
taken on the level of the local school system as well as by state school
boards and even state legislatures. 80 Because of these attempts to
178. Ibid.
179. See Keller v. Sacramento City United School Dist., No. 1465, Calif. Super.
Ct., Sacramento County, Oct. 8, 1963. "The Board obviously has many alternatives in
alleviating de facto segregation ....

Unless there are violations of legal guide lines

courts should not attempt to supervise the administration of schools. Rather, this is
the proper function of the community's educational policy makers elected by the
community." Id. at 6. This case is important because it is the first lower court
decision following Jackson.
180. Most of the voluntary action taken to ease racial imbalance has occurred in
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eliminate racial imbalance, a number of questions are raised as to the
validity of such voluntary action. Are constitutional rights violated
when Negro children are bussed into non-contiguous school zones so
that the schools are racially balanced? Are constitutional rights
violated when school zones are altered because of racial considerations? Are constitutional rights violated when new schools are placed
in certain areas to achieve racial balance?
These constitutional questions are raised most frequently in actions
challenging the validity of the school board's action. The basic argument advanced is that no student can validly be required to attend
New Jersey, California, New York and Maryland. This footnote summarizes the most
important developments taken to secure racially balanced schools in these states.
(1) New Jersey-On March 16, 1962 the Newark, New Jersey, Board of Education
adopted a resolution establishing an Optional Pupil Transfer Policy. This policy permitted students to transfer from schools in which there was an "unduly high ethnic
concentration" to other schools with uncrowded facilities and a better "ethnic balance."
The resolution provided that this policy was not to be deemed in degrogation of the
usual practice of attendance zones based on the neighborhood school policy. Also
the transfer policy did not include transportation financed by the School Board. 7 RACE
BEL.

L. REP. 269 (1962).

(2) California-The California State Board of Education in a statement made on
June 14, 1962 announced the state's policy against de facto segregation in the public
schools. The statement declared that "in all areas under our control or subject to our
influence, the policy of elimination of existing segregation and curbing any tendency
toward its growth must be given serious and thoughtful consideration by all persons
involved at all levels." 7 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1267 (1962).
Accordingly, the state administrative code was amended to provide for the establishment of attendance areas and new school location policies which would tend to
cause a balancing of the races. The regulation adopted by the California Superintendent of Public Instruction on September 28, 1962, required a consideration of
both the present and future ethnic composition of an area in selecting school sites.
CAL. ADv.

CODE tit. 5, § 2001.

An even more significant regulation was adopted by the State Board of Education on
October 18, 1962. The regulation amended the code to provide for the establishment
of school attendance areas in school districts.
"For the purpose of avoiding, insofar as practicable, the establishment of attendance
areas which in practical effect discriminate upon an ethnic basis against pupils or
their families or which in practical effect tend to establish or maintain segregation on
an ethnic basis, the governing board of a school district in establishing attendance
areas in the district shall include among the factors considered the following:
(a) the ethnic composition of the residents in the immediate area of the school.
(b) The ethnic composition of the residents in the territory peripheral to the
immediate areas of the school.
(c) The effect on the ethnic composition of the student body of the school based
upon alternate plans for establishing the attendance area.
(d) The effect on the ethnic composition of the student body of adjacent schools
based upon alternate plans for establishing an attendance area.
(e) The effect on the ethnic composition of the student body of the school and
of adjacent schools of the use of transportation presently necessary and provided
either by a parent or the district." CAL. ADMX. CODE tit. 5, § 2011.
Shortly thereafter, the 1963 session of the California legislature approved the
establishment of a commission in the Department of Education to assist and advise local
school districts in problems related to various aspects of racial discrimination. Among
the commission's duties is to "upon request from a district, advise and assist school
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or excluded from attending a certain school because of his race.' 8 '
It is contended that the equal protection clause requires that official
action be "colorblind" and thus the thrust of this contention is that
any correctional scheme which relies on racial considerations is violative of the Constitution. 8 2 This theory holds that any action based
on racial considerations aimed at providing the Negro with equal
educational opportunity is just as unconstitutional as action taken to
restrict his opportunities.
Justice Harlan inadvertently supplied the basis for this argument
opposing racial balancing in the schools by his famous dissent in
districts in problems involving the ethnic distribution of pupils and school attendance
areas." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 363.
(3) New York-The New York State Commissioner of Education issued a memorandum on June 14, 1963, directing all local school administrators and school board
presidents to re-examine racial imbalance in local schools, to declare local policy in
regard to such imbalance, to report on progress made in eliminating such conditions, and
to formulate plans for future corrective action. The Commissioner emphatically stated
that the position of the Department "is that racial imbalance existing in a school in
which the enrollment is wholly or predominantly Negro interferes with the achievement
of equality of educational opportunity and must therefore be eliminated from the
schools of New York State." 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 738, 739 (1963).
Reinforcing the Commissioner's conclusions as to racial imbalance, the Commissioner's
Advisory Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions issued on June 17,
1963 a statement entitled Guiding Principles for Securing Racial Balance in Public
Schools. The Committee indicated in the statement that "a cardinal principle in the
effective desegregation of a public school system is that all of the schools which
comprise that system should have an equitable distribution of the various ethnic and
cultural groups in the municipality of the school district." 8 RACE REL. L. Ri'. 739,
740 (1963).
With these pronouncements from the state policy-makers providing the impetus, a
number of local school boards in New York have taken remedial action to reduce racial
imbalance.
New York City's "plan for integration" prepared by the Board of Education and
Superintendent of Schools is described as "the most comprehensive effort to achieve
maximum integration . . . of any . . . city school system in the country." Letter of
Transmittal from Calvin E. Gross to James E. Allen, Jr., reported 8 RACE REL. L.
REP. 1240 (1963). This plan includes a free choice transfer policy as well as the
elimination of elementary school classes in junior high schools in order to accommodate
more free-choice transfer pupils and a system of rezoning in fringe areas to effect more
integration. This rezoning would facilitate the use of the Princeton Plan as applied
either to pairs of schools or to multiple school composites. New York Plan For
Integration,8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1241 (1963).
(4) Maryland-The Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners adopted a resolution on September 5, 1963, declaring a policy of promoting an overall principle of
equality of educational opportunity for persons of all ethnic, racial, cultural and
economic backgrounds. This policy was aimed at the racially imbalanced school
because "racially imbalanced schools may lead to educational, psychological, and
sociological problems." 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1226, 1227 (1963). To resolve this
problem "Board policies and school practice shall be reviewed to insure that they are
not discriminatory or do not contribute intentionally to racial imbalance." Ibid.
181. Rice, The Legality of De Facto Segregation, 10 CATHoLic LAW. 309, 314
(1964).
182. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 205-97 (1963).
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Plessy v. Ferguson,183 in which he said:
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before
the law. 8 4
Brown was considered to establish this colorblind principle for public
education with the consequence that the Constitution should be
considered neutral as between efforts to promote segregation and
integration in that it forbids both. The only exception recognized
under this theory is "where corrective action must be taken to remedy
a condition created by the unconstitutional action of the official
body involved in the litigation."' 83
Although the use of Justice Harlan's "constitutional metaphor" as
the basis of a constitutional theory preventing racial balancing has
been considered valid by some authorities, 186 the majority of legal
scholars and courts have generally discredited this view.
In light of the original purpose of the fourteenth amendment, 187
the better view of this amendment is that it forbids only invidious
discrimination. 188 It must be remembered that this colorblind principle
was announced in the context of an attack on the "Jim Crow" Laws
and was utilized in an attempt to help the Negro secure equality.'8 9
Certainly, it would be anomalous to use the same theory to prevent
the Negro in the racially imbalanced school from attaining equal
educational opportunity. 190
183. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 559.
185. Hyman & Newhouse, Desegregation of the Schools: The Present Legal Situation, 14 BurALo L. REv. 208, 227 (1964).
186. See generally Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962). See also Kaplan, supra note 182;
Rice, supra note 181.
187. See generally Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of Equal Protection
of the Laws, 50 CoLTrJ. L. REv. 131 (1950).
188. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
189. "If we look at the Constitution rather than a constitutional metaphor, and at
the history of the fourteenth amendment, we find that the most obvious fact about
it is that it grew out of the Civil War in an effort to raise Negroes from a level of
inferiority. Certainly in two situations there can be little doubt of the validity of
preferential treatment of Negroes: first where public facilities are in fact unequal and
there is de facto segregation placing the Negro in the unequal facilities, and second,
where de facto segregation is a product in part, a remnant, of government discrimination in the past." Freurd, Civil Rights and the Limit of Law, 14 BurFx~o L. Rnv.
199,205 (1964).
190. "The principle of color blindness cannot mean that a governmental body may
not recognize that racial differences exist between individuals and that some schools
are racially imbalanced while others are not. Such a principle would render even the
census unconstitutional. Although the ultimate vision of society may promise that
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It has been suggested that justifiable discrimination is permissible
as a constitutionally valid procedure. In the Japanese Relocation
Cases,'91 the Supreme Court upheld protective discrimination on the
basis of nationality because of a determination that there were policy
reasons that justified this action. 92 Where the lawful object involved
is securing equal educational opportunity for the Negro, it seems
clear that voluntary racial balancing should not conflict with the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment.
The Attorney General of California states this view of the fourteenth
amendment quite succinctly in an opinion upholding the consideration of race in the adoption of a school attendance plan:
To decide that the combined thinking and efforts of persons of all races

may not recognize a present inequality as the starting point in a program
designed to help achieve that equality which Justice Harlan sought would

be to conclude
not merely that the Constitution is color-blind, but that it is
193
totally blind.
B. The Judicial Response
The vigorous attempts of many school authorities, particularly in
New York and New Jersey, to reduce racial imbalance has been met
in many communities by equally vigorous efforts to maintain the
status quo. As a result of the ensuing controversies, educational
policies of these communities have been scrutinized by both state
and federal courts.
The school board's action is ordinarily contested by white parents
who either oppose the transfer of Negro pupils to a formerly all-white
school in their neighborhood, or oppose the transfer of their children
to a school other than their neighborhood school. When this voluntary action has been challenged, the courts have faced an extremely
perplexing question of constitutional law. There is a wide range
between what is constitutionally required or prohibited and what is
constitutionally permissible. Because the whole of the law on this
racial differences among individuals will be ignored, this does not mean that government must now blind itself to a physical reality which plays an enormous role in a
person's life and his social relations." Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools:
The ConstitutionalConcepts, 78 HAnv. L. RBv. 569, 575 (1965).
191. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
192. "The uneasiness with these cases arise not from the application of the principle
that a legitimate purpose may make race a relevant concern but, rather from doubts
that the needs of national security justified the totally oppressively restrictions that
were chosen." Fiss, supra note 190, at 577.
It must be pointed out that these Japanese Relation cases, were determined on the
basis of nationality rather than race. The importance of these cases, however, rests in
the fact that the classification, on whatever basis, was upheld by the Supreme Court.
193. 42 Ops. AT'ey GaNr. 33-35 (1963), 8 RACE RELt. L. REP. 1303, 1305 (1963).
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latter question is contained in a number of very recent New York and
New Jersey cases, these cases must be considered carefully.
1. New York.-Balaban v. Rubin,9 4 is certainly the most publicized

of the recent New York decisions. In this case, the parents of two
white children brought a class suit to annul a zoning determination

adopted by the Board of Education of the City of New York. This
determination was made necessary by the construction of Junior High
School 275 which was scheduled to open in the southerly part of an
area in Brooklyn known as Brownsville in September 1963. Peti-

tioner's children lived in East Flatbush, and had J.H.S. 275 not been
built, would have attended J.H.S. 285 which was located in their
own neighborhood. The school zone originally proposed for J.H.S.
275 by Dr. Morris Platnick, Assistant Superintendent of Schools in

that district, was rejected by the School Board "because he had failed
to accord adequate consideration to the undesirable de facto segregation of Negro and Puerto Rican children that would obtain in J.H.S.

275 if his plan had been adopted."195 The school zone which was
subsequently adopted resulted in a relative equalization of the races'
in J.H.S. 275 and evidence indicated that this racial balance was the
factor which caused the Board to approve the zone finally
compelling
197
adopted.
In judging the validity of the Board's zone, in addition to racial
equalization, it is important to note that this plan required no transportation of children from other school zones to J.H.S. 275, that the

zone fixed for J.H.S. was reasonable and regularly shaped with the
school close to the center of the zone, and that most of the children
in the disputed area lived closer to J.H.S. 275 than to J.H.S. 285.190
The petitioner argued that the School Board's inclusion of racial
194. 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct.
148 (1964), affirming 20 App. Div. 2d 438, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1964), reversing 40
Misc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
195. 40 Misc. 2d at 251, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 975. It must be added however that this
zone was geographically irregular and the school was placed in the approximate corner
of an oddly shaped area which was remote from the zone's northern area.
196. Under the Plodnick proposal the racial and ethnic composition of the incoming
class would be 52% Negro, 34% Puerto Rican and 14% white; whereas, under the
school zone finally approved and adopted, the percentages would be 35.2% Negro,
33.5% Puerto Rican and 31.2% white. Ibid.
197. See affidavits submitted by Dr. Francis A. Turner, Assistant Superintendent of
Schools and Bernard E. Donovan, the Acting Superintendent of Schools which indicate
clearly that the site for J.H.S. 275 was selected and attendance zones were promulgated
to increase the measure of integration in these schools. Ibid. It must be admitted,
however, that the Board took into consideration all of the following factors: "(1)
distance from home to school; (2) utilization of school space; (3) convenience of
transportation; (4) racial integration of the school; (5) topographic barriers; and (6)
continuity of instruction." 20 App. Div. at 441, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
198. Ibid.
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balance as a factor in determining school zones violated section 3201
of New York's Education law as well as the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. The New York Supreme Court at Special Term, Kings
County,19 9 did not reach the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in holding on the basis of section 3201200 that the Board's
action should be annulled.
Although the Board argued that the history of the statute indicated
that it was intended to prohibit segregation of minority groups in
public schools, the court looked only to the fact of the statute. "By its
very terms (the statute) proscribes exclusion from public schools of
any child by reason of race, creed, color or national origin." 201 Because the petitioner's children were excluded from J.H.S. 285, their
neighborhood school, due to racial considerations, the statute was
202
held to have been violated.
The Appellate Division0 3 reversed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the School Board properly acted to reduce racial imbalance. The significance of this conclusion is diminished, however,
because of the reliance by the Appellate Division on the factual circumstances of this case. The most important of these facts being that
all the children involved in this litigation lived either closer to or no
farther from J.H.S. 275 than from J.H.S. 285. Thus, the court concluded that J.H.S. 275 "is the school in the district of their residence,"20 and section 3201 would have been violated only if these
children had been excluded from this neighborhood school.
The Appellate Division then looked to the purpose of section 3201
and found it clearly an anti-segregation statute.20 5 Thus, if section
3201 was used to invalidate a zoning plan that accomplishes integration it would have been turned into a segregation law-a result
completely inconsistent with the purpose of the statute.
It has been argued that the rationale of this case allows the School
Board to act to alleviate racial imbalance only as long as children
199. 40 Misc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
200. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3201, which provides as follows: "No person shall be
refused admission into or excluded from any public school in the state of New York
on account of race, creed, color or national origin."
201. 40 Misc. 2d at 252, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
202. Special term re-zoned the disputed area; that is, the area in which the fifty-one
white children reside, and placed it within the zone for J.H.S. 285, in which it was
previously embraced.
203. 20 App. Div. 2d 438, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1964).
204. Id. at 443, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
205. "It is thus conclusive from the history of section 3201 that its sole purpose was
to ...prevent segregation in the school system." 20 App. Div. 2d at 444, 248 N.Y.S.2d
at 580 (1964).
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are able to attend schools in the district of their residence.2 11 If this
is true, this is a very real limitation
on the power of the School
20 7
Board to correct racial imbalance.

In considering the petitioner's constitutional objections to the
School Board's action, the appellate division maintained that the
Brown case did not require that "there must be an intermingling of
the races in all school districts." 208 The court further said Brown did
not mean, for example, that white children who live in non-contiguous
or outlying areas must be 'bussed' into a Negro area in order to de209
segregate a Negro school.
However, the court said the fact that integration is not required
by the federal constitution does not prevent school boards from using
racial or ethnic factors in a voluntary attempt to prevent racial imbalance. For authority to substantiate this position, the court pointed
to the language in the second Brown decision,2 10 in which the Supreme
Court stated that the courts may consider problems related to .. .
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units
to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on
a non-racial basis.21'
This, the Appellate Division maintained, was "direct authority for
a board of education to take race into consideration as one of the
212
factors in the delineation of a school zone."

This language expounded by the Supreme Court is valid to sustain
the court's conclusion only where school zones have previously been
purposely utilized to create segregation. 2 3 It is important to note that
in this case, however, school zones had not been previously tampered
with to prevent integration. Here racial imbalance had resulted simply
from shifts in housing patterns. Thus, it would seem, at least under
the rationale used by this court, that the language of the Supreme
206. This interpretation of Balaban was utilized in Strippoli v. Bickal, 42 Misc. 2d
475, 248 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1964), and Di Sano v. Storandt, 43 Misc. 2d 272,
250 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
207. If the school is racially imbalanced, the neighborhood will also likely be
racially imbalanced. Thus, in most cities, balancing of the races in the schools will
require bringing students from other districts.
208. 20 App. Div. 2d at 446, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
209. Ibid.
210. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
211. Id. at 300.
212. 20 App. Div. 2d at 447, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
213. The cases cited by the court for authority on this point, Taylor v. Board of
Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), and Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d
853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956), involve intentional gerrymandering
of school zones. Obviously, to secure protection of constitutional rights where there
has been unlawful segregation, race would have to be considered in rezoning. But
considered in the context of fortuitous racial imbalance, this language in the second
Brown case would seem to indicate that race should not be considered in zoning.
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Court requiring admission on a "non-racial basis" is circumvented by
taking race into consideration in school zoning. Perhaps in an attempt
to strengthen a rather loosely written opinion, the Appellate Division
additionally buttressed its conclusion by pointing out that all other
zoning criteria pointed to the fact that the zone was determined in
a reasonable way with due regard for the safety,
convenience and
21 4
better education of the children in the zone.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
Appellate Division. 215 The scope of the Appellate Division's opinion
was neither broadened nor narrowed by the Court of Appeals' answer
to the question of whether schools may correct racial imbalance.
The Court of Appeals said: "The simple fact as to the plan adopted
and here under attack is that it excludes no one from any school and
has no tendency to foster or produce racial segregation."2 16 The court
also emphasized that "no child will have to travel farther to a new
school 275 than he would have had to go to get to his 'neighborhood'
217

school."

While it is clear from Balaban that in favorable circumstances a
school board may act to reduce racial imbalance, this case did not
provide the requisite authority for a concerted utilization of race as a
zoning criteria.
Shortly after Balaban, the validity of voluntary action by school
boards to ease racial imbalance was again challenged in two cases
involving schools in Rochester, New York. The Supreme Court of
Monroe County reached decisions in Strippoliv. Bickal2 8 and Di Sano
21 9 which seriously limited the efficacy of the Balaban
v. Storandt,
decision.
The City School District in Rochester was divided into attendance
zones on the basis of the neighborhood school system. The original
dividing lines had been established without considering race, color,
or ethnic origin.
Schools #3
miles apart.
changes over
(85.3%) while

and #30 are . . . located approximately two and one-half
By reason of fortuitous residence pattern and population
the years, #3 school became overwhelmingly non-white
2 20
430 remained 100% white.

214. It was emphasized that there was easy access to the school from all parts of the
zone and also that the school was centrally located within the zone. 20 App. Div. 2d at
448, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
215. 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1964).
216. Id. at 195, 199 N.E.2d at 377, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
217. Ibid.
218. 21 App. Div. 2d 364, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th Dep't 1964), reversing 42 Misc.
2d 475, 248 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
219. 22 App. Div. 2d 6, 253 N.Y.S.2d 411 (4th Dep't 1964), reversing 43 Misc.
2d 272, 250 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
220. 42 Misc. 2d at 476, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
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On November 21, 1963, the Board of Education adopted a resolution directing the completion of plans for open enrollment.2 21 The

resolution adopted indicated that the purpose of open enrollment
was to "move forward with the implementation of its (Board of
Education) policy on racial imbalance."2
Shortly after this policy
was adopted, "one hundred and eighteen (118) non-white pupils

comprising all of the fifth and sixth grades in school #3 were transferred to school #30."223

The date of the transfer, January 7, 1964,

is relevant because the transfer was made in the middle of the school
year.224 The school zones were not contiguous and the pupils were

transported daily by bus. Also, during this same period students
were being transported from school #4 to school #40.225

The plaintiffs in Strippoli challenged specifically the action taken
by the Rochester School Board in transferring Negro children from

schools #3 to #30, 2 6 while the plaintiffs in Di Sano attacked the
Open Enrollment Plan on the basis of its validity as city-wide policy.22
The School Board in Strippoli denied the plaintiffs claim that
racial imbalance was the major factor motivating the transfers from
#3 to #30. The Board argued that the sole purpose of the transfers
was to relieve over-crowded conditions in school #3, and persistently
maintained that racial imbalance or integration was not discussed
22 8
or mentioned at any of the Board of Education meetings.
After evidence was presented both by the School Board and the
221. An open enrollment plan allows a Negro child to enroll in any school where
there is room, regardless of the child's attendance zone. The use of geographic criteria
is not abandoned, but there is no rigid adherence to geographic zones. This in essence
gives an opportunity to avoid racial imbalance if the individual so desires.
In practice, this open enrollment plan has proved to be unsatisfactory in making a
real reduction in racial imbalance. This is true because the basic factors that cause
racial imbalance-poverty, discrimination, lack of opportunity and housing segregationalso operate to frustrate a plan of open enrollment.
222. 43 Misc. 2d at 275, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
223. 42 Misc. 2d at 476-77, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 591-92.
224. "As part and parcel of this transfer the teachers were also taken along and
these 118 non-whites were deliberately co-mingled or integrated with an equal
number of white pupils in the same grades. So that, some children in each grade
had a permanent change of teacher in the middle of the school year." 42 Misc. 2d at
274, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
225. 43 Misc. 2d at 274, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 704. These transfers were attacked
specifically in Di Sano while the open enrollment plan was contested generally.
226. 42 Misc. 2d at 477, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
227. 43 Misc. 2d at 274. 250 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
228. 42 Misc. 2d at 477, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 592. In ascertaining the School Board's
motive for these transfers the court gave great weight to a report prepared by the
Rochester School Board for the State Commissioner of Education. The report was
entitled Racial Imbalance in the Rochester Public Schools and contained an analysis
of de facto segregation as well as various proposals to be used in solving this problem.
One of these proposals required the closing of school #3 over a five-year period during
which students of school #3 would be transferred to schools where percentages of
non-whites in attendance were low. 42 Misc. 2d at 478, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
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plaintiffs, the court held that the curing of racial imbalance rather
than overcrowding, was the basic reason for the transfer of students
from #3 to #30.
That it was a plan to cure racial imbalance is objectively obvious beyond
the possibility of other explanation. Their protestations that the sole intent
was to relieve overcrowding gives rise to an inference that they feared the
controversial transfer would be held illegal if made to cure racial imbalance. 2

Thus, in Strippoli, a New York court was faced with adjudicating
the validity of the large-scale transporting of Negro children who lived
in a non-contiguous area into a white area to alleviate racial imbalance. The trial court resolved this issue by holding that the transfers from school #3 to school #30 violated section 3201 of the New
York Education Law, as well as the Constitution of New York
(article I, section 11), and the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution.
In holding that section 3201 was violated by the transfers, the court
completely disregarded the language in Balaban which indicated the
purpose of the statute was to prevent segregation. The court here
relied solely on the Malverne decision,230 which held that an order
of the State Commissioner of Education requiring action be taken
to alleviate racial imbalance violated section 3201. Since the decision
in Malverne has since been reversed by the Appellate Division 31
it would seem that this restrictive interpretation of section 3201 will
not be accepted by New York's appellate courts.
The Strippoli court also held that these transfers were an unconstitutional exercise of power by the School Board.
These constitutional guarantees mean that a non-white pupil has just as
much right to be educated in a public school as a white pupil, but it also
means, and equally so, that a child should not be enrolled or transported to
a certain schoolhouse because he is white or non-white. To apply such a
test, overtly or covertly, is reverse discrimination making racial membership
a qualification for such a move, when it really should be irrelevant and
2
immaterial. 32

The court relied on the Bell case for authority despite the fact
that the constitutional question in that case was limited to whether
229. 42 Misc. 2d at 480, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 594.

230. Matter of Vetere, 41 Misc. 2d 200, 245 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
231. Vetere v. Mitchell, 21 App. Div. 2d 561, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dep't 1964).
Regardless of its reversal, Malverne was not valid authority for the proposition for
which it was cited because the issue in Malverne was whether the school board must
act to alleviate racial imbalance. The issue was not, as it was in Strippoli, whether the
school board may act to reduce racial imbalance.
232. 42 Misc. 2d at 485, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
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the School Board of Gary Indiana, was required to act to reduce racial
imbalance. As for Balaban, the court limits the rationale of that decision to a situation in which the school board, in drawing attendance
lines for a new school, can "take into consideration the ethnic
composition of the children therein in order to prevent the deliberate
creation of a segregated public school."

3

The court further held that

the dicta in Balaban, which indicated Brown does not require the
transportation of children from non-contiguous areas to alleviate racial
imbalance, sustains the conclusion that the Rochester School Board
may not act in this manner to ease racial imbalance.234
The court also looked to the sociological effects of the School
Board's action.
It is detrimental to both Negro and white children to uproot them from
their communities and haul them from one school to another in order to force
integration. . . Wholesale shifts (such as in this case) are harmful to
both white and non-white ....
It threatens to reduce an individual to an
integer to be shuffled about by authority without reference to his own
preference or other ties of family and other social groupings . . . that
innocent children of any race should be used as pawns in these weird

sociological chess games is nothing short of reprehensible ....

Our law and

our courts must not become mere extensions of sociologists' work-shops. 2

Three months after the Strippoli decision, the Supreme Court of
Monroe County held Rochester's Open Enrollment Plan clearly un-

constitutional in the Di Sano decision.2 6 As in Strippoli, the court
based its decision on the conclusion that the attempt by the School
Board to correct de facto segregation was not "desegregation but
discrimination since Negro children, with or without the consent
of their parents, are denied attendance at their neighborhood school
237
solely because of color."

Not satisfied with either of these decisions, the Rochester School
Board appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of
the trial court in Strippoli thirteen days after the trial court had
rendered the Di Sano decision.218 The Appellate Division held that
there were valid educational reasons for these transfers, giving great
emphasis to the evidence of overcrowding at school #3 as well as to
evidence indicating that there was vacant space which could be
233. Id. at 487, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 601.

234. It is important to note, however, that the New York Court of Appeals in
affirming the Appellate Division in Balaban did not utilize this interpretation of
Brown. Judge Desmond's opinion limited comment on Brown to a statement that it
proscribes state imposed segregation.
235. 42 Misc. 2d at 489-90, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 603-04.
236. 43 Misc. 2d at 278, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
237. Ibid.
238. 21 App. Div. 2d 364, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d
1036, 209 N.E. 2d 123, 260 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1965).
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utilized at school # 3 0.239 Although the racial aspect was clearly a
factor involved in the transfer, the court maintained on the theory
of Balaban that "a determination of the Board of Education which
is otherwise lawful and reasonable does not become unlawful merely
because the factor of racial balance is accorded relevance"
Following the same theory the Appellate Division also reversed
the trial court in Di Sano. 41 Considering only the constitutionality
of the Open Enrollment Plan, the court held that the objective of the
plan, racial balancing, was constitutional. However, the court indicated that when the plan was examined in the context of specific
transfers, there might be grounds of objection if "the operation . . .
of the plan is arbitrary or capricious." 24
The rationale adopted by the Appellate Division seems to be that
as long as there is some valid educational purpose which justifies the
action of the school board, then that action is not invalidated merely
because it has some effect on racial imbalance. In many cases, this
issue is resolved as a question of fact. Was the determination of the
Board of Education "otherwise lawful and reasonable? In Balaban,
the school zone was established consonant with sound educational
standards and the protesting students actually remained in their
neighborhood. In Strippoli, the reduction of overcrowding as well as
racial imbalance sustained the transportation of Negro students to an
all-white school in a non-contiguous school zone.
Recent New York decisions on the trial court level have adhered
to this rationale. In Addabbo v. Donovan,43 the New York City
Board of Education's school pairing plan was upheld, although the
court acknowledged that "the reduction of racial imbalance in our
public schools" was "a very important-probably the most important2
factor" in the pairing plan. 4
The plan litigated in Addabbo combined adjoining public elementary schools six blocks apart and did not require transportation of the
protesting children. In this case, there was a clear showing that not
only would the pairing plan significantly reduce racial imbalance, but
239. "The evidence clearly established that the facilities at School No. 3 .. .were
badly overtaxed. The most serious overcrowding of classrooms was found at the Fifth
and Sixth grade levels, where the class size ranged from 29 to 37 students as contrasted with a city-wide average of 28.4 students and a recommended size of
26....
"In comparison, School No. 30 ... was a new school with seven vacant classrooms."
21 App. Div. 2d at 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 970-71.
240. Id. at 367, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
241. 22 App. Div. 2d 6, 253 N.Y.S.2d 411 (4th Dep't 1964).
242. Id. at 9, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
243. 43 Misc. 2d 621, 251 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 33 U.S.L. Week
2380 (App. Div. 2d Dep't Jan. 11, 1965), aff'd, 209 N.E.2d 112 (N.Y. 1965).
244. 43 Misc. 2d at 626-27, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 862-63.

1332

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

25
also it would effectuate a number of sound educational reforms.
The New York City pairing plan was also upheld in Schnepp v.
Donovan,246 the trial court finding that racial imbalance was only one
of the factors involved in the adoption of the plan. In this case, the
inconvenience to the transferred children was, at the most, minor
since the two schools involved were only five city blocks apart. Also,
the court found that,

the contemplated pairing will result in substantially-reduced class sizes,
additional professional services, a better opportunity for supervisory personnel to concentrate on child development and the adaption of the
curriculum and at the same time the children will be afforded
an early
247
opportunity to live and work together in a multi-racial setting.

Only in Blumberg v. Donovan,248 has the pairing plan been held
unacceptable by a trial court. In this specific situation the plan was
considered unacceptable not because racial imbalance was a motivating consideration behind the plan, but because the results of the
pairing in this case were "arbitrary and unreasonable" in compelling
the transfer of petitioner's children, who are of tender years (grades
three to six) and who now attend a school across the street from where they
live, to a school approximately nine-tenths of a mile away, to and from
which, if they return home for lunch, they must walk a total of about
four miles a day, and each of the four times they make this trip must 249
cross
twelve street intersections including two heavily trafficked streets ....

Where the pairing does not produce arbitrary inconveniences, it seems
clear that it will be upheld by the New York courts as long as it
secures sound educational results.
This result was further indicated when the recent action taken by
the Syracuse branch of the New York Board of Education in closing
a junior high school and transferring 233 pupils to a nearby junior
high was sustained in Katalinicv. City of Syracuse. 2 0 In this litigation
the Board conceded "that racial imbalance was one of the factors
which played a part in arriving at its decision." 251 Here again, the
court found "otherwise lawful" reasons for the transfers in that the
receiving junior high school had a more adequate staff and facilities
and was considered better able to meet the needs of the students
245. Among other things it was clear that class size and overcrowding would be
reduced by the pairing of the schools. 43 Misc. 2d at 625, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
246. 43 Misc. 2d 917, 252 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1964).
247. Id. at 919, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 545.

248. 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
249. Ibid.
250. 44 Misc. 2d 734, 254 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1964).

251. Id. at 736, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
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than was the closed junior high school. The Supreme Court, Onondaga
County went even further in dicta, stating:
[E]ven if the Court were convinced that the sole purpose in closing the
Junior High School portion of Precott School and in transferring the students
to Madison School was for the correction of a situation of racial imbalance,
which it was not, the Court still would be of the opinion that at this time
it has no power to hold that 2said action would be arbitrary and capricious
or a Constitutional violation.2s

Clearly this dicta is not supported by any of the New York Appellate
decisions but this statement indicates the direction the courts may
take when faced with a situation in which, either through naivete
or ineptness, the school board can show no other motivation for its
action except to reduce racial imbalance. In these circumstances,
the Katalinic dicta indicates that the New York courts may find, as
have the New Jersey courts, that the policy considerations motivating
become so strong as to obviate
the reduction of racial imbalance 25may
3
justifications.
other
for
the need
2. New Jersey.-In New Jersey, a number of communities have attempted to deal with racial imbalance in the public schools. The
constitutionality of this action has been contested and sustained
before the State Commissioner of Education as well as in the state
and federal court systems. In Morean v. Board of Education,2 4 four
junior high school pupils and one elementary school pupil filed a
petition before the State Commissioner of Education arguing that
they had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed them by the fourteenth amendment. This deprivation
was alleged to result from action taken by the Montclair Board in
closing a predominately Negro junior high school,25 5 and dividing
the pupils evenly among the other three junior high schools until a
plan to replace all these schools with a single, centrally located new
school could be effectuated. The relocation plan required the parents
of the pupils being relocated to state their first, second and third
252. ibid.
253. See Van Blerkom v. Donovan, 22 App. Div. 2d 71, 253 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1st

Dep't), reversing 44 Misc. 2d 356, 254 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
254. 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964).
255. Glenfield Junior High was closed for at least two major reasons. The first was
economic in nature because Glenfleld was the junior high school with the smallest
pupil population and the highest annual per capita cost of operation."

42 N.J. at

239, 200 A.2d at 98. This aspect of the school closing was not contested by the
petitioners. The second reason for closing Glenfield was to bring about total integration
in the junior high schools. There are four junior high schools in Montclair known as
Hillside, George Inness, Mt. Hebron and Glenfield. "The approximate Negro population of Glenfield was then 90%, of Hillside 60%, and of George Inness 18%. Mt.
Hebron bad no Negro pupils." Ibid.
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choices, and a lottery then assigned them to their first choice as long
as space remained available, then to their second choice, and finally
to their third choice. 256 The petitioners argued that the crux of the
"equal protection" deprivation was the application of the neighborhood school policy throughout Montclair, but not to the residents
in the zone where Glenfield Junior High School had been
who lived
57
closed.2
The Commissioner of Education dismissed the petition, holding
that the Board's action was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable,
After the state Board of Education affirmed the Commissioner's action,
petitioners appealed to the state courts.
In affirming the decision of the administrative officials, the supreme
court first recognized that "racial imbalance . ..though fortuitous
in origin, presents much the same disadvantages as are presented by
segregated schools." 258 Although the court's authority for this conclusion leaves much to be desired, 259 it then turns to the basic question-may school boards utilize racial criteria to control the racial
balance of their schools? The court summarily rejected the petitioners'
argument that "racial classifications" violate the equal protection
256. The relocation plan was considered desirable by the Board because it would
achieve greater racial balance until a single junior high school could be completed in
1966. Testimony before the trial court indicated the reason the Board of Education
desired to achieve racial balance in its junior highs.
"Mrs. Halligan testified that such dispersal of the Glenfleld pupils among the other
schools was educationally desirable since it is a distinct advantage to students to be
exposed to children of all kinds of backgrounds. Dr. Hinehley testified to the same
effect, noting that one of our great democratic strengths is the intermingling in our
public schools of students from varying economic and social surroundings." 42 N.J.
at 240, 200 A.2d at 98-99.
257. The petitioner's argue the "double standard of school assignment" violates
the equal protection clause because it is racially motivated. From an economic standpoint the action of the school board seems impervious to attack. This seems to be a
rather effective method of resolving the problems attendent to the relocation of pupils
after the elimination of an economically unfeasible school. Also, a number of cases
reveal that there is no constitutional mandate requiring the use of the neighborhood
school plan. Taylor v. Board of Educ., supra note 213; Blocker v. Board of Educ.,
226 F. Supp. 208 (1964). However, the basis of the petitioner's argument was racial
motivation. The petitioner is attempting to establish first that the intention of the
school board was to achieve racial balance and second that such an intention is
violative of the equal protection clause.
258. 42 N.J. at 243, 200 A.2d at 100.
259. The court seems to feel that this proposition is one that has been established,
Here the court assumes too much. This is one of the basic questions that plagues the
courts dealing with this type of question. Although dealt with in a number of decisions, the courts rarely give a decisive answer to this question. This is indicated from
the cases cited by the court to sustain this proposition. Of the six cases cited,
Jackson, Blocker, and Branche all involve racial imbalance caused by varying degrees
of racially motivated conduct. Bell and Evans clearly held that fortuitous racial imbalance did not create enough disadvantage to the pupil so as to violate his constitutional rights. Only the New York court in Balaban reached the same conclusion as
this court.

NOTES

1335

clause of the fourteenth amendment, 260 and held that the purpose
of these 26"racial
classifications" is determinative as to their constitu1

tionality.

Constitutional colorblindness may be wholly apt when the frame of
reference is an attack on official efforts toward segregation; is not generally
apt when the attack is on official efforts toward the avoidance of segrega262
tion.

Thus, the court found that Montclair's plan was intended to lead to

integration rather than segregation263 and held that although the
relocation plan was racially motivated, it was not violative of the
fourteenth amendment.
While the State Supreme Court was considering racial imbalance
in Montclair, the New Jersey Federal District Court in Fuller v.
Volk, 26 4 was determining the validity of a controversial plan adopted
by the city Board of Education to ease racial imbalance in Englewood,
New Jersey.
Prior to the adoption of the Englewood Plan, pupils were generally
assigned to the five elementary schools in Englewood on the basis
of residence in the designated attendance areas. As of September
19, 1962, there was an extreme concentration of Negro pupils in Lincoln School;
of the 505 pupils enrolled in Lincoln, 98 per cent were
25
Negro. 1
The Englewood Plan was adopted to comply with a decision of the
State Commissioner of Education266 which directed the Englewood
Board of Education to reduce racial imbalance in the elementary
schools. This decision was aimed primarily at Lincoln School. The
plan, which was approved by the Commissioner 267 on August 1, 1963,

260. It seems that petitioner had no specific holdings which could reinforce this
conclusion. Thus, petitioners were forced to resort to cases which broadly upheld the
recognized principle that state discriminations against Negroes deprive them of the
equal protection of the laws.
261. See Coss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (racial classifications for
transfer purposes were declared unconstitutional).
262. 42 N.J. at 243-44, 200 A.2d at 100.
263. 42 N.J. at 244, 200 A.2d at 99.
264. 230 F. Supp. 25 (D.NJ. 1964).
265. The Englewood elementary schools, their enrollment and their racial composition were as follows:
School
Enrollment
% White
% Negro
Cleveland
477
99.6
.4
Liberty
418
38.0
62.0
Lincoln
505
2.0
98.0
Quarles
343
96.8
3.2
Roosevelt
345
85.5
14.5
230 F. Supp. at 27.
266. Spruill v. Board of Educ., 8 RACE REL. L. RE'. 1234 (1963).
267. See letter from F. M. Raubinger to Mrs. Winifred R. Schambera, reported, 8
RACE REL. L. REP. 1239 (1963).
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provided for two basic changes in the school system. First, a city-wide
school would be established at Engle Street to which all sixth grade
pupils in the city would be assigned. Second, all pupils of grades one
through five who resided in the Lincoln School attendance district
were to be assigned to the Cleveland, Quarles and Roosevelt Schools
on a discretionary basis.26 8 As a result of this plan, by November 12,
1963, there was no longer an undue concentration of any one ethnic
group in any one of Englewood's elementary schools. 2 9
The plaintiffs, as parents of white children in Englewood, contended that the plan was adopted solely because of racial considerations; that their children, because of their color, were discriminated
against by being deprived of the right to attend their neighborhood
schools, and thus the plan was unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs primarily relied on the authority of the Bell case to
support their contentions. Since Bell held the School Board had no
affirmative duty to act to prevent racial imbalance, the plaintiffs
argued that conversely, the School Board could not voluntarily act to
ease racial imbalance.270 The plaintiffs were forced to rely on Bell
because at this time no court had held that voluntary action by the
School Board to ease racial imbalance was constitutionally proscribed.
Judge Augelli immediately discounted the relevance of the Bell
case by sharply characterizing the issue before the court as "not
whether a local board of education must or is constitutionally required
to act, but rather whether a board may or is not constitutionally pro-

hibited from acting."2 71 Following the state courts of New Jersey
and New York in Morean and Balaban, Judge Augelli resolved this
issue by holding that "a local board of education is not constitutionally
prohibited from taking race into account in drawing or redrawing
school attendance lines for the purpose of reducing or eliminating
de facto segregation in its public schools." 7 2
This decision is entirely consistent with the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision in Morean. On the basis of these decisions, there
would seem to be no constitutional prohibition aimed at voluntary
action taken by school boards to ease racial imbalance in New Jersey.
The use of racial criteria in formulating school assignment plans does
not, per se, discriminate against white children. The court in Fuller
points out that "only if specific provisions of the Plan do in fact
discriminate against plaintiffs because of their race, could it be said to
result in an infringement of their constitutional rights."2 7 3 On the
268. 230 F. Supp. at 28.

269. Id. at 30.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
ibid.
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basis of the court's assessment of the Englewood plan, it would seem
that a New Jersey school board acting voluntarily to alleviate racial
imbalance would have few problems in drafting a plan which would
avoid this minor prohibition.274
IV.

CONCLUSION

Until the Supreme Court ultimately resolves the basic legal questions stemming from racial imbalance in the schools, the state and
federal courts will be forced to deduce from Brown and its progeny
the validity of racial imbalance. Using Brown as a governing principle, racial imbalance caused by racially motivated conduct is
clearly invalid. Where racial imbalance results fortuitously, there is a
split of authority.
The majority view, represented by decisions of two Circuit Courts
of Appeals-the seventh in Bell and the tenth in Downs-finds no
requirement in Brown that educational authorities must act to alleviate
racial imbalance. The courts which followed this view have adhered
to a technical interpretation of Brown which emphasizes the importance of racial classification. Proponents of this view also point to
the fact that there is no definite sociological proof of a causal relationship between fortuitous racial imbalance and academic deprecation
or psychological harm to the Negro child.
Finding that school authorities must act to ease racial imbalance,
a few courts have held that racially imbalanced schools deprive the
Negro child of equal educational opportunity. The validity of this
deprivation is unquestionable as regards the educational goals of
inducting the pupil properly into the culture and environment in
which he must live. The Negro pupil in a racially imbalanced school
does not receive this educational interaction with pupils of other races
so as to be properly prepared for entrance into a white-oriented culture. The possibility of this minority view being more widely accepted
depends to a large degree on the ability of the plaintiff's attorneys
to emphasize from the academic, psychological, and cultural standpoints, the inequalities of the racially imbalanced school.
The validity of voluntary action taken by public educational
authorities, has been more consistently upheld. The New Jersey
Courts have held unqualifiedly that school boards may act to racially
274. This conclusion is further sustained by the decision of the Appellate Division

of the New Jersey Superior Court in Schutts v. Board of Education, 86 N.J. Super. 29,
205 A.2d 762 (1964), which upheld action taken by the Board of Education of
Teaneck, New Jersey to achieve better racial balance. The court held the constitutional principles involved in this case had already been clearly decided in Morean so
that "a local board of education may adopt a reasonable plan to resolve a de facto
segregation situation." Id. at 41, 205 A.2d at 769.

